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This paper discusses the nature and effects of social grants programmes in South Africa 
against the backdrop of international trends in the reform of social assistance systems. It 
shows that South Africa has a well-developed social assistance system that significantly 
reduces extreme poverty, in part because the grants are very well targeted. The review 
of existing literature and new evidence presented in this paper suggest that the grants 
influence the behaviour of recipients and potential recipients in various ways, not all of 
which are necessarily benign. The paper also highlights the scope for further research on 
the potential of workfare programmes, conditional cash transfer programmes and other 
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1 This document was prepared for the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) as one of the technical papers 
that supported the Commission’s recommendations on the division of revenue among the three spheres of 
government in the 2010/11 financial year. We are grateful to the Commission for funding the research and for 
permission  to  make  the  document  available  in  this  format.  The  FFC  published  an  abridged  version  of  the 
document as chapter 3 of the Technical report: Annual submission on the division of revenue 2010/11, which is 
available on its website (http://www.ffc.co.za/docs/). It should be noted that the paper is reproduced here as 
submitted to the FFC in January 2009 with editorial changes only. Some of the information provided on aspects 
of the South African social security framework no longer is up to date.   3 
Efficiency and equity effects of 
social grants in South Africa 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Social security systems provide protection against risks of income loss due to con-
tingencies such as old age, unemployment, disability, and injuries sustained at work. 
As  such,  they  play  an  important  consumption-smoothing  role  by  redistributing 
income across time. Apart from this function, social security systems also redistribute 
income between generations and amongst the insured according to risk and vulnera-
bility. Social security systems typically consist of three parts:
 2 
  Social insurance: benefits organised by the state and funded by means of 
specified contributions by employers and employees 
  Social assistance (grants): non-contributory cash or in-kind grants to provide 
protection to the most needy 
  Informal insurance: cash or in-kind assistance from the extended family and 
other social networks 
Despite being a middle-income country, South Africa has an extensive formal social 
security system with many of the trappings of a modern welfare state. This paper 
focuses on the social assistance part of the system, which is particularly well deve-
loped by international standards. Section 2 outlines the evolution, present nature and 
coverage and aspects of the institutional framework of the social security system in 
South Africa. Section 3 discusses the role and economic effects of social grants in 
other countries, as well as broad currents in the reform of social assistance systems 
Particular  attention  is  given  to  workfare  programmes  in  OECD  countries  and 
conditional cash transfer programmes in Western Hemisphere developing countries. 
Against this background, Section 4 surveys existing literature on the efficiency and 
equity effects of social grants in South Africa, while Section 5 presents new empirical 
evidence on aspects of these effects. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2  SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
2(a)  History of social security in South Africa
3 
The origins of the South African social security system should be sought in attempts 
to create a welfare state for whites during the apartheid era. The objective was to 
protect  whites  against  various  contingencies  by  means  of  social  insurance  and, 
when that failed, social assistance (social old-age pensions, for example, protected 
elderly whites with inadequate private pension income from indigence). 
                                                 
2 Social security systems often are complemented by other social programmes such as education and 
training  programmes,  health  insurance  schemes,  specialised  care  facilities  and  protective  labour-
market policies. These programmes fall outside the scope of this paper. 
3 This section draws on Van der Berg (1997) and Van der Berg (2002).    4 
The first pension fund in South Africa was established in the South African (Trans-
vaal) Republic in 1882. The earliest pension funds were not prescribed by legislation 
or by convention; as such; they did not represent social insurance. In the 1920s, 
however, many skilled (mainly white) employees obtained occupational retirement 
insurance. Binding industrial-council and other agreements between employers and 
employees eventually introduced an element of compulsion into many occupational 
insurance schemes, thus turning them into quasi-social insurance schemes.
4 The 
Pensions Funds Act of 1956 was a major milestone as far as regulation of the finan -
cial responsibilities of pension funds is concerned. The norm of excluding less-skilled 
workers from coverage remained, however; in the apartheid context, this meant that 
almost all blacks were excluded. Occupational retirement insurance was expanded 
to less-skilled workers only in the 1960s and early 1970s, when  rapid industrialisa-
tion increasingly drew black workers into industry. The total membership of occu pa-
tional and private retirement funds increased from 923  000 in 1958 to 9 309 000 in 
1993 – an average annual growth rate of almost 7 percent over a period of more 
than  three  decades  (Smith  Committee,  1995:  D2.4a).
5  Some industries  (such as 
agriculture, domestic service, and trade, catering and accommodation) nonetheless 
remained poorly covered. The majority of the black labour force remained out side 
the formal social insurance net, either because of unemployment or because they 
occupied jobs not covered by social retirement insurance. 
Various racially differentiated social grants were introduced between 1910 and 1950, 
including military pensions (1919), social pensions (1928), grants for the blind and 
the disabled (1936 and 1937), pensions for war veterans (1941) and family allowan -
ces for large poor families (1947). Protection against unemployment remained com -
paratively underdeveloped, because job reservation and higher education and skill 
levels assured most whites of employment since the time of the Great Depression. 
The institution that was established to do so, the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF), only provided cover against cyclical unemployment,  which was usually mild 
and of relatively short duration. State welfare expenditure helped to maintain white 
support for the apartheid regime. By comparison, the safety net for other groups 
initially was rudimentary. The grants were progressively extended to other population 
groups over time, however, albeit initially at much lower benefit rates. 
 
A major impetus for social reform from the early 1970s onwards came from attempts 
to legitimise the homeland system and the tricameral parliament (which consisted of 
white, coloured and Indian chambers). Attempts at co -option led to rapid growth in 
the amounts flowing to the homelands and subsequently, albeit even before the 
establishment of the tricameral parliament in 1983, to the coloured and Indian com -
munities. The fiscal costs of incorporating the relatively small coloured and Indian 
groups into a welfare society were not too great a burden on the budget, though this 
coincided with other events that also contributed to fiscal stress. 
                                                 
4 In South Africa, unlike in many other countries, contributions paid by employers and employees are 
not included in social security taxes, because they do not flow through the coffers of the state. Inter-
national comparisons of the extent of social security provision based on government spending ratios 
therefore misrepresent the scope of insurance provision in South Africa. 
5 These figures reflect extensive duplication, because many South Africans belong to more than one 
fund.   5 
The far greater fiscal challenge, namely full incorporation of blacks into the system 
and elimination of the racial barriers that had allowed the welfare state for whites to 
flourish, was postponed. Only in the latter part of the 1980s did the government com-
mit itself to eliminating racial differentials in benefit structures of all social program-
mes. Fiscal constraints, however, meant that the equalisation of benefit levels could 
be achieved only by combining decreases in the real value of the maximum social 
pension received by whites with increases in that received by blacks. This was most 
readily accomplished in areas where resistance to reducing white benefit levels was 
weakest. One notable example was means-tested social old-age pensions, because 
relatively  poor  elderly  whites  were  a  small  and  politically  marginal  group  whose 
benefits could be reduced with little fear of political backlash. By 1993 the pension 
gap had been closed completely and discrimination in the application of the means 
test had been eliminated, with all groups receiving roughly the same real grant level 
per beneficiary as was received previously by coloureds and Indians (see Figure 1). 
The equalisation of benefits, introduction of the child support grant in April 1998 and 
rapid growth in take-up of disability and foster-care grants led to sharp increases in 
government  spending  on  social  assistance  grants  from  the  late-1980s  onwards. 
Figure 2 shows general government spending on social protection (which includes 
outlays  by  the  contributory  social  funds  and  grants  expenditure  by  government 
departments)  as  percentages  of  general  government  outlays  and  gross  domestic 
product (GDP). General government spending on social protection increased from 
6.2 percent of total outlays in 1982/83 to 13.4 percent in 2005/06 (i.e. from 1.8 per-
cent to 4.4 percent of GDP).
6 
The number of beneficiaries of social grants increased from 2.4 million in April 1998 
to a projected 12.4 million in 2008 (cf. Table 1). Projections published by the National 
Treasury (2008: 96) in February 2008 suggested that 66.6 percent of all grants paid 
                                                 
6 The sharp spike in both ratios in 1993/94 reflected a special transfer of R7 340 million to the Govern-
ment Employees Pension Fund. 
Figure 1
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in April 2008 would have been child support grants; other large categories would 
have  been  old-age  pensions  (17.9 percent),  and  disability  grants  (11.4 percent). 
Although  all  the  grant  types  except  the  war  veteran  grant  and  grant-in-aid  expe-
rienced significant growth in beneficiary numbers during the past decade, the child 
support grant clearly was the major driver of such growth in the system as a whole. 
Because it is the smallest of the grants in rand terms, however, the child support 
grant does not dominate social assistance expenditure.
7 The 2008/09 Budget pro-
vides for social assistance expenditure of R70.7 billion, of which R26.4 billion is allo-
cated for old-age pensions, R21.6 billion for  child support grants, R17.7 billion for 
disability grants and R5.0 billion for other grants (National Treasury, 2008: 319). 
Table 1 
  Beneficiaries of social assistance grants (1998-2008)   
  Grant               Number of beneficiaries   
    1998  2003  2008
1   
  Old age  1 697 725  2 009 419  2 225 354   
  War veterans  10 525  4 594  1931   
  Disability  660 528  953 965  1 409434   
  Grant-in-aid  9 183  12 787  –   
  Foster care  43 520  138 763  446 994   
  Care dependency  8 172  58 140  110 153   
  Child support  –  2 022 206  8 208 334   
  Total  2 429 653  5 808 494  12 402 200   
  Source:  National Treasury Budget review (various issues)   
  Note: 
1 Projections made in February 2008   
                                                 
7 Section 2(b) provides more detail on the current monthly values of the various grants. 
Figure 2
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly bulletins (various issues)
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Its apartheid-era roots therefore influenced the South African social security system 
in at least two important ways. First, the general extension of a system that initially 
was created to provide comprehensive protection for a segment of the population 
rendered  South  African  social  assistance  unusually  comprehensive  for  a  middle-
income developing country. Second, the system's initial focus on the particular needs 
of whites (for whom unemployment historically was not a major risk), made it inade-
quate for an economy in which structural unemployment became a crucial problem. 
2(b)  The existing social security system 
The insurance component of the South African social security system consists of 
three contributory social security funds that provide conditional income support or 
compensation for defined-risk events (the Unemployment Insurance Fund, the Com-
pensation Funds, and the Road Accident Fund) and – in the indirect sense explained 
in Section 2(a) – a large number of occupational pension schemes. Figure 3 shows 
that the consolidated social security funds generally have been in surplus in recent 
years.  The  Compensation  Funds  and  the  Unemployment  Insurance  Fund  have 
achieved cash-flow surpluses since 1999/00 and 2001/02, respectively, but the Road 
Accident Fund has remained deficit-ridden. 
As was indicated in Section 2(a), the number of recipients of social assistance grants 
increased rapidly during the past few years. The estimated 12.4 million beneficiaries 
in April 2008 represented more than one quarter of the South African population – a 
figure unmatched by any other developing country. Social assistance spending in 
South Africa, which amounted to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2006, is high even when 
compared to that of Western European countries at the height of the welfare state in 
1980.  Of  the  countries  shown  in  Figure  4,  only  Denmark  had  a  higher  social 
assistance  expenditure  ratio  than  is  presently  the  case  for  South  Africa.  South 
Africa's government spending on social grants exceeds the GDPs of 88 countries, 
including some 35 African countries. 
Figure 3
Cash-flow of the social security funds (1991/92-2007/08)
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One way to outline the scope of South African social security system is to compare it 
to those of the advanced welfare states. The ―life course framework‖, which is asso-
ciated with northern European social protection systems, includes interventions for 
each of the life stages of individuals and families (cf. Table 2). Contributory program-
mes and universal tax-financed benefits dominate such systems; by comparison, the 
targeted social assistance components are small. Targeted programmes, however, 
play an important residual role by assisting those not reached by other elements of 
social security programmes (De Neubourg, Castonguay and Roelen, 2007: 9-13). 
  Table 2   
  A life course social security framework   
  Age 0-16  Age 16-24  Age 24-60  Age 61+   





insurance  Universal pensions   






      Contributory 
survivors‘ pensions 
 
        Means-tested social 
assistance 
 
  Disability allowances  Disability allowances  Disability allowances  Disability allowances   
  Source: De Neubourg, Castonguay and Roelen (2007)   
Table 3 lists most aspects of the South African social security system in a related but 
adapted framework.
8 South Africa relies much more heavily on means -tested social 
assistance grants than the advanced welfare states; contributory social insurance 
                                                 
8 Two elements are omitted from the table: compensation paid to victims of road accidents by the 
Road Accident Fund, and temporary grant-in-aid relief payments. 
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and universal social assistance programmes, on the other hand, are relatively less 
well developed in South Africa. The remainder of this section discusses the various 
elements of the South African social security system in more detail. 
  Table 3   
  Elements of the South African social security framework   
  Childhood  Working age  Old age   














  Foster care grants  Temporary unemployment 
benefits  Occupational pensions   
Childhood 
The  child  support  grant,  which  was  introduced  in  April  1998  to  replace  the  child 
maintenance grant, currently is the most important form of assistance for children in 
poor families. These grants initially were paid to the primary caregivers of children 
under the age of seven years, but the coverage of the programme was extended 
gradually and from January 2009 it will cover children until their fifteenth birthday.
9 
This expansion of the programme, coupled with rapid growth in the take -up rate in 
the new millennium, contributed to the sharp increase in the number of beneficiaries 
to an estimated 8 208 334 in April 2008 (see Table 1). According to the Department 
of Social Development (Rakoloti, 2008), recent changes to the means test that 
determines eligibility for the child support grant are likely to increase the number of 
beneficiaries by a further 1 million, that is, by about 12 percent.
10 
The monthly value of the child support grant initially amounted to R100. Pauw and 
Mncube (2007: 18-19) showed that its real value decreased until 2000, but increased 
fairly rapidly thereafter. Following increases of R10 per month on 1 April 2008 and 1 
October 2008, the grant now amounts to R230 per month. 
Care dependency grants are paid to the parents or caregivers of children between 
the ages of 1 and 18 years who suffer from severe physical and mental disability and 
are in permanent home care. (Disabled persons between the ages of 18 and the 
retirement age receive state disability grants.) In April 2008 these grants, which now 
amount  to  R940 per  month,  were  paid  to  an  estimated  110 153  care-dependent 
children. The regulations announced on 30 May 2008 provide for a changed means 
test for care dependency grants similar to that for child support grants. 
The beneficiaries of foster care grants are children deemed in need of care by the 
courts. Such children are placed in the custody of foster parents designated by the 
courts and supervised by social workers. The aim of the grant is to reimburse the 
foster parent or parents for the cost of caring for children who are not their own; as 
                                                 
9 Resources permitting, the Government intends to increase the qualification age limit for the child 
support grant up to the eighteenth birthday in the medium term (Skweyiya, 2008). 
10 Section 2(c) discusses the mean tests for the various social grants in more detail.   10 
such, the grant is not means tested and falls away if the child is adopted formally. 
Foster care grants now amount to R650 per month, and in April 2008 were paid to 
the foster parents of 446 994 children. 
Working age 
It is well known that South Africa suffers from exceptionally high unemployment that 
is largely of a structural nature. Statistics South Africa's (2008b) Labour force survey 
for the first and second quarters of 2008 reported an unemployment rate of 23.5 per-
cent  in  the  second  quarter,  which  implies that  almost  4.2 million  members of  the 
labour force were unemployed at the time of the survey. The role of the Unemploy-
ment  Insurance  Fund  (UIF)  therefore  is  particularly  important.  Employees  and 
employers each contribute 1 percent of the employee‘s monthly earnings up to a 
threshold of R12 478 to the UIF, and the proceeds are used to pay benefits to contri-
butors or their dependents in instances of unemployment, illness, death, maternity 
and  adoption  of  a  child.  The  amended  Unemployment  Insurance  Act  of  2003 
changed the coverage and benefits of the UIF in important ways: 
  Coverage was extended to include domestic and seasonal workers. 
  Coverage was extended to include employees earning more than the speci-
fied earnings ceiling (but contributions and benefits were capped at this level). 
  A graduated income replacement rate was introduced (the rate ranges from 
60 percent for low-income earners to 38 percent for higher-income earners). 
  A limit on benefits accrual to 238 days in a four-year period was introduced. 
  Contributors resigning voluntarily from jobs were excluded from benefits. 
These  reforms  have  had  important  ramifications  for  the  Fund.  The  extension  of 
coverage  to  employees  earning  more  than  the  specified  earnings  ceiling  implied 
incorporation  of  a  group  whose  contributions  are  large  relative  to  their  risks  of 
unemployment; this should improve the solvency of the UIF and enhance its redistri-
butive impact. Although it has strengthened redistribution within the UIF, the intro-
duction  of  differentiated  replacement  rates  has  weakened  its  role  as  an  income-
maintenance instrument (especially for upper income earners). 
A turnaround strategy has markedly improved the finances and financial manage-
ment of the UIF. The National Treasury (2008: 97-98) reported that the Fund had 
achieved  unqualified  audit  reports  during  the  past  two  years,  and  an  actuarial 
valuation  in  March  2007  indicated  that  it  would  be  able  to  meet  its  cash-flow 
requirements over the next ten years for a range of possible claims scenarios. The 
UIF‘s capital and reserves amounted to R18.5 billion at the end of March 2006. 
The basic role of the UIF remains the provision of short-term benefits that combat 
the effects of frictional and cyclical unemployment. It was not designed to combat 
large-scale structural unemployment. The reality that only about one in every seven 
unemployed persons (600 000 out of a total of 4.2 million) receive UIF benefits is 
indicative of the limited scope of unemployment compensation in South Africa. 
The  Compensation  Funds  provide  income  benefits  and  medical  care  to  workers 
injured on the job, funding for the rehabilitation of disabled workers, and survivor 
benefits to the families of victims of work-related fatalities. The main Compensation 
Fund is administered by the Department of Labour and covers workers in sectors   11 
other than mining and construction, while the Department of Health administers the 
Mines and Works Compensation Fund, which provides benefits to victims of working 
conditions-related  lung  diseases.
11  Levies  on  employers  finance  these  funds. 
Various efficiency-enhancing reforms of the main Compensation Fund have been 
implemented as part of a turnaround strategy initiated in September 2007. The com-
bined accumulated surplus of the compensation funds at the end of March 2007 
amounted to R7.2 billion. 
State disability grants are available to people disabled in circumstances other than 
road and work-related accidents. The grant is paid to disabled persons between the 
ages of 18 and the retirement age who do not receive other state grants and who are 
not cared for in state institutions. Eligibility is determined by strict medical-based cri-
teria:  the  disability  should  be  permanent  and  sufficiently  severe  to  prevent  the 
affected person from entering the labour market. Hence, the purpose of the grant is 
to compensate disabled persons for loss of income. The same means test applies to 
disability grants and social old-age pensions – see Section 2(c). 
Old age 
South Africa has a well-established retirement fund market. Membership of an occu-
pational fund is widely accepted as an obligatory condition of employment, and the 
coverage rate for formal-sector employees of about 60 percent is high by interna-
tional standards. According to the National Treasury (2007a: 5), South Africa's ratio 
of  pension fund  assets  to  GDP  of  63 percent  compares favourably  with  those  of 
countries such as Australia, Chile, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. 
Coverage rates, however, vary considerably across income categories. Middle- and 
high-income earners are well covered: the National Treasury (2008: 100-101) recent-
ly reported that almost all formal-sector employees who earn more than R120 000 
per annum belong to a pension, provident or retirement fund. Favourable tax treat-
ment contributed to this relatively high level of cover. Among lower-income earners, 
however, coverage is much less comprehensive: some 360 000 formal employees in 
the R60 000 to R120 000 income category and fully 2.7 million of those earning less 
than R60 000 per annum are without retirement coverage. In total, only an estimated 
5.9 million of the 8 million formal-sector workers (i.e. roughly one-half of the about 
12.3 million employed  and one-third  of the  16.8 million economically  active  South 
Africans) have retirement coverage (National Treasury, 2008: 100). 
Moreover, income replacement rates for pension and provident fund members often 
are  inadequate  because  of  limited  access  to  cost-effective  instruments  combined 
with  early  withdrawals.  Estimates  indicate  that  less  than  half of  those  who  reach 
retirement  age  with  a  funded  pension  receive  more  than  28 percent  of  their  pre-
retirement incomes (National Treasury, 2007a: 5). The Smith Committee (1995: 18) 
found  that  40 percent  of  occupational  pensions  paid  had  a  lower  value  than  the 
social old-age pension. 
Lower-income  South  Africans  (including  many  formal-sector  workers)  therefore 
depend on social pensions in old age. The means-tested social pension is payable to 
persons of retirement age and older; during his Budget Speech in February 2008, 
                                                 
11 The mining and construction sectors have separate compensation arrangements.   12 
the Minister of Finance announced that the retirement age for men will be lowered 
gradually from 65 to 60 years to bring it in line with those of women by 2010. As was 
indicated earlier, the maximum amount of the pension currently is R940 per month 
and in April 2008 an estimated 2 225 354 elderly people received it. The means test 
for the social old-age pension is discussed in Section 2(c). 
2(c)  Targeting and means testing 
Targeting  and  means  testing  are  important  aspects  of  the  South  African  social 
security system for at least three reasons. First, their aim is to channel resources 
allocated to social security programmes to those in greatest need. Hence, means 
testing and other targeting mechanisms are key determinants of the efficiency of 
resource use in social security systems. Second, they link and integrate the occupa-
tional insurance and social assistance aspects of the system. Third, they have major 
influences on the behavioural incentives created by the system. 
Targeting 
Two types of errors could arise in the process of targeting social grants. Errors of 
exclusion occur when poor people are excluded from benefits, while errors of inclu-
sion occur when there is a leakage of funds meant for the poor to those who are not 
poor.  Such  errors  have  their  origins  in  the  functioning  of  targeting  mechanisms. 
There are a number of alternative mechanisms for targeting grants or other subsides 
to the poor: 
  Means testing is generally used in South Africa for social grants. 
  Categorical subsidies or transfers are also sometimes linked to indicator tar-
geting. This is for instance the case with the free health care for pregnant 
woman and young children that was introduced at the time of the transition to 
democracy in South Africa. Though pregnant woman and young children are 
not all poor, the fact that these services are subsidised does mean that many 
poor people benefit from it, although there would be errors of exclusion and 
errors of inclusion involved in this. 
  Geographic targeting targets certain areas because they house many of the 
poor. In South Africa the child support grant had an element of geographic tar-
geting (the means test that applied until 2008 favoured rural areas and squat-
ter areas), as does the housing subsidy (which favours urban areas). 
  A fourth mechanism is self targeting. The Working-for-Water project, which 
pays low wages to people willing to work on certain projects, relies on this 
mechanism. Only the poor are usually willing to work at such low wages, with 
the result that it targets itself: only the poor are the beneficiaries. 
Targeting can be costly in a number of senses. The costs of administering targeting 
can amount to as much as 3 to 8 percent of the value of the grants, for example, and 
tend to increase with attempts to improve the accuracy of targeting. Furthermore, tar-
geting  often  carries  moral  hazard  and other  incentive  costs:  introducing  targeting 
often leads to changes in the behaviour of potential beneficiaries that are undesi-
rable from society‘s viewpoint. Some people, for example, may stop working to claim 
an unemployment grant. A third cost of targeting is stigma. In many Anglo-Saxon 
countries, where means testing is common, some people do not want to be seen as 
―being on welfare‖; hence, they refuse to apply for grants to which they are entitled.   13 
Only poor children can participate in certain school feeding programmes in South 
Africa, and some poor children refuse to do so because of the associated stigma. In 
such cases, it may be better to consider making the grant available to everybody, 
despite the higher costs (i.e. committing an error of inclusion), rather than to exclude 
some poor children through the stigma effect (an error of exclusion). Finally, target-
ing also involves political economy costs. For instance, the political support for a 
grant targeted only at very poor people may be less than that of a grant reaching a 
larger group, as is the case with the South African old age pension. 
Analysis  based  on  concentration  curves  suggest  that  South  Africa‘s  social  assis-
tance grants are well targeted. The derivation of a concentration curve is similar to 
that  of  a  Lorenz  curve  in  that  one  first  arranges  the  population  from  poorest  to 
richest, after which the curve is plotted. In the case of the Lorenz curve, cumulative 
income is shown on the Y-axis and the cumulative population share on the X-axis. 
The  further  the  Lorenz  curve  bends  from  the  diagonal,  the  greater  the  extent  of 
inequality. In the case of the concentration curve, the cumulative benefit, subsidy or 
grant is shown on the Y-axis and the cumulative percentage of the population on the 
X-axis. If the concentration curve lies above the Lorenz curve, such spending is at 
least weakly redistributive. When the concentration curve also lies above the diago-
nal, the spending programme is strongly redistributive or equity enhancing. In this 
case, the concentration curve shows targeting towards the poor, i.e. redistribution in 
per capita terms. Figure 5 shows a Lorenz curve and a concentration curve for social 
grants  in  1997.  Whereas  the  Lorenz  curve  lies  below  the  diagonal  in  the  usual 
fashion, the concentration curve lies well above it. Whilst it is not possible for the 
bottom 40 percent of the population, for instance, to earn more than 40 percent of 
the income, it is indeed possible for them to receive more than 40 percent of the 
spending on social grants. In 1997, for example, the bottom 40 percent of the popu-
lation received approximately 70 percent of the spending on social grants. 
Figure 6 indicates that government spending on grants is markedly better targeted at 
the poor than are other forms of social spending. The concentration curve for social 
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grants in 2000 lies well above those for other social programmes; hence, the degree 
to which the poor‘s actual share of spending on such grants exceeds their propor-
tional share is greater than for other social expenditure programmes. This is con-
firmed by Table 4, which shows concentration indices for social spending program-
mes for both 1995 and 2000. A concentration index is calculated much like a Gini 
index, but its value is negative when the concentration curve rises above the dia-
gonal. As can be seen in the table, the concentration indices for social grants in both 
1995 and 2000 were negative, and considerably lower than those for other social 
expenditure items. 
Table 4 
  Concentration indices for social programmes (1995 and 2000)   
  Programme               Concentration indices   
    1995  2000  Change   
  School education  -0.016  -0.104  -0.088   
  Tertiary education  0.484  0.497  0.013   
  Health: hospitals  -0.014  -0.057  -0.043   
  Health: clinics  -0.103  -0.132  -0.029   
  Social grants  -0.434  -0.431  0.003   
  Housing  -0.018  0.007  0.025   
  Total  -0.057  -0.120  -0.063   
 
The various social grants are not  targeted equally well. Figure 7 shows that social 
old-age pensions were targeted best in 2000, followed by disability grants. Child sup-
port grants and maintenance grants were targeted less well. The child support grant 
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programme was not yet fully rolled out in 2000, however, and therefore may not have 
reached poorer and especially rural areas as well as it should have. The situation 
may well have improved markedly since then. 
It transpires from Figure 8 that grants programmes also are more effective than other 
social spending programmes at reaching the rural poor. In 2000, for example, rural 
dwellers comprised only 42 percent of the South African population, but received ful-
ly 56 percent of the social grants disbursed. 
Figure 7
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Figure  9  contains  cumulative  density  or  cumulative  distribution  curves  for  five 
groups. The income per capita of individuals was derived by allocating to them ave-
rage income per capita of the household in which they resided. The curves show that 
poverty was less prevalent amongst the elderly than amongst the population as a 
whole: a smaller proportion of the pension-aged fell under any poverty line one could 
draw than was the case for the overall population. Put differently, there was so-called 
stochastic poverty dominance – irrespective of the poverty line chosen, the pension-
aged exhibited less poverty than the population as a whole. This was undoubtedly 
the  result  of  the  wide  reach  of  the  old-age  pension,  which  made  it  an  important 
source of income even in relatively poor rural areas.  
In contrast, in 1995, when this figure was derived, the children in the age groups 0 to 
6 and 7 to 14 experienced greater poverty than the population as a whole, and even 
than  the  narrowly  unemployed.  However,  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  between 
children 0 to 7 and children 7 to 14 in terms of this graph, so it is clear that the nature 
and extent of poverty in these two groups did not really differ. Therefore, it made 
sense that the child support grant was later extended from the younger age group to 
the older group of children as well, which considerably reduced poverty. It is notice-
able also that the narrowly unemployed, although poorer than the population as a 
whole, were not as badly off as children, who more often found themselves in poorer 
households than was the case for those narrowly unemployed. (This, however, was 
before the introduction of the CSG.) 
Means testing is essential for ensuring that funds target the poor rather than the less 
poor part  of  the  population.  Means  testing  has  always  been  a  part  of  the  South 
African social grant system (see Van der Berg, 2001), and the major social grants 
are  linked  to  explicit  means  tests.  The  remainder  of  this  subsection  outlines  the 
current means tests for the various social grants in South Africa, while Section 3 
discusses their incentive effects. 
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In his Budget Vote Speech delivered on 30 May 2008, Minister of Social Develop-
ment  Zola  Skweyiya  (2008)  announced  new  social  assistance  regulations  that 
included changes to the various means tests. The new means tests are as follows: 
  Over time, failure to adjust the exclusion thresholds announced when the child 
support grant was introduced in April 1998 (household income levels of R800 
per month for children living in formal urban dwellings and R1 100 for those 
living in rural areas and informal urban dwellings) prevented growing numbers 
of  children  from  accessing  assistance.  The  revised  test  has  a  significantly 
higher exclusion threshold and no longer differentiates between urban and 
rural  areas. The new  formula for determining  the  income  threshold for the 
child support grant is A = B * 10, where A is the income threshold and B the 
monthly value of the grant. Following the increase in the value of the grant to 
R230 per month,  the  income  threshold now  amounts  to  R2 300 per month 
(previously R1 900 per month). 
  The new means test for care dependency grants is similar to that for child 
support grants: A = B * 10, where A is the income threshold and B the monthly 
value  of  the  grant.  The  monthly  grant  amounts  to  R940,  which  implies  an 
income threshold of R9 400 per month (previously R4 000 per month). 
  The means test formula for the  social old-age pension is: D = 1.3A – 0.5B, 
where D is the monthly pension payable, A the maximum monthly pension 
payable, and B the monthly private income of the beneficiary. Of course, this 
is subject to the constraint that the maximum grant cannot exceed the set 
maximum, which now amounts to R940 per month (R11 280 per annum). An 
additional provision states that the cost of administering grants smaller than 
R100 per  month  is  regarded  as  excessive;  hence,  no  such  grants  are 
payable.  The  maximum  grant  of  R11 280 per  annum  therefore  is  paid  to 
elderly people with private incomes of R6 768 per annum or less (see Figure 
10).  A  clawback  (or effective  marginal tax  rate) of  50 percent  operates for 
incomes from R6 768 to the exclusion level of income of R26 400 per annum. 
Yet another proviso states that no grant is paid to individuals whose assets 
exceed R450 000 (i.e. 40 times the maximum benefit). 
  The same means test formula applies to the disability grant: D = 1.3A – 0.5B, 
where is the monthly disability grant, A the maximum monthly disability grant, 
and  B  the  monthly  private  income  of  the  beneficiary.  The  grant  may  not 
exceed  the  set  maximum,  which  now  amounts  to  R940 per  month 
(R11 280 per  annum).  Additional  provisions  state  that  grants  amounting  to 
less than R100 per month are not payable, and that no grant is paid to indivi-
duals whose assets exceed R450 000 (i.e. 40 times the maximum benefit). 
Being subject to the same means test implies that the disability grant gives rise to a 
poverty trap similar to that affecting the social old-age pension. Indeed, there is little 
incentive for a disabled person to take up work. The problem is compounded by the 
reality  that  the  work  offered  to  the  disabled  tends  to  be  temporary  and  low-paid 
(Lund, 1998: 12), which makes the income differential between the wage and the 
disability grant rather small.   18 
The means test sometimes penalise lower-income workers with inadequate occu-
pational pensions to such an extent that their retirement incomes (i.e. the sum of the 
occupational pension and the social pension) are only slightly higher than those of 
others who have contributed for much shorter periods. In this sense, the means-
tested  nature  of  the  social  old-age  pension  reduces  the  incentive  for low-income 
earners to join a retirement fund. 
 
The  first  question  one  should  ask  when  discussing  means  testing  is  whether  it 
serves as a means of inclusion or a means of exclusion. If the means test is set at a 
high level, such as case with the social old age pension, it is largely used to exclude 
a small segment of the population with a fairly high income from benefiting. In South 
Africa‘s case, approximately 80 percent of the eligible age group receive social old 
age pensions. In contrast, if means testing is to be used to focus only on the bottom 
part of the population, i.e. to target a relatively small group of very poor people, it 
could be much more difficult to apply, because at such low income levels the poor 
cannot  always  be  clearly  distinguished  from  the  less  poor.  This  is  linked  to  how 
incomes are usually distributed, i.e., they tend to follow a log–normal distribution, 
meaning that there is a lot of bunching of incomes around low income levels. It is 
therefore very difficult to draw a poverty line that runs through the middle of this 
bunching of incomes and to separate those who are very poor from those who are 
slightly less poor, as has been attempted with the child support grant. For this reason 
the means test for the child support grant is quite difficult to apply and there are 
probably many errors of inclusion as well as errors of exclusion, plus a large degree 
of discretion in application of this grant, which makes the means test problematic. 
However, because of the relatively small magnitude of the grant compared to the old 
age pension and disability grant, a more complex means test is also not desirable. 
The working of the means test should be considered in the context of the income 
distribution.  It  is  crucial  where  the  centre  of  the  log-normal  distribution  lies.  Until 
recently, it was probably below the threshold value of where the sliding scale started 
to operate, as very few black people had retired with private retirement income. This 
Figure 10
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is changing, however, as changes in the 1970‘s had brought more black people into 
the  social  insurance net,  so that many  of them  are  now  entering  retirement  with 
some level of private pension. That means that more and more people are retiring 
with  private  incomes  in  the  range  where  the  sliding  scale  is  supposed  to  be 
operating,  making  application  of  the  means  test  more  difficult  and  accurate 
information about people‘s actual private incomes essential. For this reason there is 
a  strong  case  to  be  made  to  extend  the  social  pension  to  include  also  the  top 
20 percent of the retired population and to take back some of this income through 
the tax system. This means in practice that the social old age pension then becomes 
a universal pension. Because South Africa is so close to that situation, and because 
of  the  increase  in  administration  costs  associated  with  trying  to  deal  with  a 
differentiated pension for different people along the sliding scale, it may be useful to 
again consider this. The Smith Committee, the Mouton Committee and the National 
Consultative Retirement Forum all considered the option of eliminating the means 
test for the old age pension, but all came to the conclusion that it was best to retain 
it, as the number of pensioners was growing more rapidly than the economy was, 
and consequently there would have been strong pressure on the fiscus as a result of 
the  expansion  of  the  number  of  beneficiaries.  However,  the  growth  rate  of  the 
economy  has  improved  and  consequently  it  may  again  be  worth  considering  the 
abolition of the means test for old age pensioners in the present conditions. 
A number of studies have shown that social pensions are major sources of income in 
the South African context (particularly for the rural poor) with important effects on 
household formation (Klasen and Woolard, 2009; Bertrand, Miller and Mullainathan, 
2003; Case and Deaton 1998; Case, Fin and McLanahan, 1999; Duflo 2003). Since 
many  adults  in  South  Africa  do  not  have  own  incomes,  households  often  form 
around available sources of income. Therefore unemployed adult children or other 
relatives of pensioners often remain in or even join such pensioner households as a 
survival strategy. This has an impact on choice of residence (urban or rural location), 
labour market participation, and may retard the growth of the urban informal sector. 
On the other hand, it brings a significant source of security for the unemployed, who 
benefit from being attached to such pensioner households. The poorest households 
are those with neither social grants nor employment. 
2(b)  The Constitutional framework 
Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996) 
stipulates that everyone has the right to have access to social security, including 
appropriate social assistance for those unable to support themselves. As is the case 
with  various  other  social  rights  conferred  by  the  Bill  of  Rights  (Chapter  2  of  the 
Constitution), it is stated further that the state should take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of this right. Hence, the South African Constitution is transformative in nature: "... it 
does  not  simply  place  limits  on  the  exercise  of  collective  power...  but  requires 
collective power to be used to advance ideals of freedom, equality, dignity and social 
justice" (Brand, 2005: 1). 
For the governments of middle-income countries such as South Africa, giving effect 
to such constitutional social rights represents a major challenge. The post-apartheid 
Government has managed to maintain fiscal discipline while significantly expanding 
the  coverage  and  poverty-alleviating  impact  of  the  social  assistance  system.   20 
Whether  or  not  enough  has  been  done  to  satisfy  the  constitutional  imperative 
obviously is difficult to establish, however, and some human-rights advocates have 
argued that a more aggressive approach was required in view of the extent and 
persistence of poverty in South Africa (e.g. South African Human Rights Commis-
sion, 2006: 65-66). 
The Constitutional Court has approached its role as the custodian of the constitu-
tional socio-economic rights with circumspection, and has been reluctant to impose 
additional policy burdens on the executive (Davis, 2006: 304). On the whole, the 
Court has rejected the notion that the South African Government has a minimum 
core  obligation  to  the  people  of  the  country  as  far  as  the  realisation  of  socio-
economic rights is concerned; instead, its jurisprudence has reflected a reasonable-
ness  approach  that  emphasises  ―…  rationality  (non-arbitrariness);  a  demand  for 
reasons backed up by evidence (justification); and proportionality between means 
and ends, between advantages and disadvantages‖ (Pillay, 2007: 4).
12 
The Constitutional Court nonetheless has not shied away from making judgments 
with significant budgetary implications.
13 This was affirmed in a case heard on 13 
and 30 May 2003 and decided on 4 March 2004  — Khosa and others versus Minis-
ter of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) — that dealt with sections of the 
Social  Assistance  Act  (No  59  of  1992)  which  disqualified  persons  who  were  not 
South African citizens from receiving social assistance grants. The Court ruled that 
the citizenship requirement infringed the Constitutional right to equality of citizens of 
other countries living in South Africa as permanent residents, and that permanent 
residents were bearers of the right to social security that the Constitution vested in 
―everyone‖. Accordingly, the Social Assistance Act (Act 13 of 2004) expanded the 
eligibility for social assistance to include South African citizens and persons resident 
in the Republic. 
2(c)  Social security administration 
The social security funds (the Compensation Fund, the Road Accident Fund and the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund) are Section 3A public entities, that is, extensions of 
government departments with mandates to fulfil specific economic or social responsi-
bilities of government. Legislation governs the management, operations and report-
ing obligations of these funds. The Commissioners of the Compensation Fund and 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund report to the Minister of Labour, while the Chief 
Executive of the Road Accident Fund reports to the Minister of Transport. 
Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996) lists 
welfare services as a functional area of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence. The White Paper for Social Welfare (Department of Welfare, 1997) pro-
posed the following division of labour: 
                                                 
12 The notion of a minimum core obligation was introduced by the United Nations‘ Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment 3 (released in 1990).  
13 In the judgment in the case Minister of Health versus Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC), the Court distinguished between scrutiny of budgetary issues directed at ―rearranging budgets‖ 
and scrutiny of budgetary issues with ―budgetary implications‖, indicating that the first type is not its 
domain.   21 
National government is responsible for developing generic norms and 
standards for providing services, and for ensuring that uniformity in the 
performance  of  particular  functions  is  maintained.  Provinces  are 
responsible,  concurrently  with  the  national  department,  for  planning, 
development  and  providing  services.  However,  where  mutual  co-
operation  between  national  and  provincial  departments  is  essential, 
powers are allocated concurrently. 
In practice, this boiled down to a separation between the administrative and delivery 
aspects of the social assistance system: overall responsibility for policy and adminis-
tration  vested  in  the national Department of  Social  Development,  while  provincial 
departments managed the payment of social grants. In 2004, administration and the 
disbursement of social grants were unified when the South African Social Security 
Agency Act (Act 9 of 2004) established the South African Social Security Agency 
(SASSA). Its mandate is regulated by the Social Assistance Act (Act 13 of 2004). 
Following the transfer of the social assistance administration and payment service 
functions to SASSA in 2006 and 2007, the national Department of Social Develop-
ment now focuses on the development and reviewing of social policy and monitoring 
of service delivery. The delivery of social welfare services is now the main activity of 
the provincial departments of social development. 
SASSA was created to promote efficiency and improve service delivery in the social 
assistance system, mainly by improving coordination and raising administrative stan-
dards. It is envisaged, for example, that consolidation and standardisation of con-
tracts with grant payment contractors (which account for 76 per cent of total pay-
ments  to  beneficiaries)  would  reduce  the  administrative  costs  of  providing  social 
grants (National Treasury, 2008: 330). SASSA also has made a concerted effort to 
combat fraud by cleaning up its records of the recipients. Among other initiatives, 
regular audits of the social pension system (SOCPEN) were introduced in conjunc-
tion with the Department of Social Development and the Special Investigations Unit. 
In 2008 it was reported that these audits have yielded the following results (National 
Treasury, 2008: 329): 
  21  588  government  employees  who  were  on  the  system  illegally  were 
removed and subjected to disciplinary actions. 
  Apart from these government employees, the removal from the system of an 
additional 143 485 people had been recommended as well. 
  The annual value of the 165 073 grants that have been suspended totalled 
R424 million. 
  6 693 people had been arrested and taken to court, where a conviction rate of 
more than 80 percent was achieved. 
  Acknowledgements of debts amounting R77.5 million had been signed, and 
R16.6 million had been recovered from recipients not entitled to grants. 
  The payment of grants to 123 610 beneficiaries had been cancelled because 
of non-collection or direct requests from beneficiaries. 
The Social Assistance Act (Act 13 of 2004) established an independent Inspectorate 
for  Social  Assistance,  funded  by  money  appropriated  by  Parliament,  to  combat 
abuse of the social assistance system and to audit compliance by SASSA with regu-
latory and policy measures and instruments.   22 
2(d)  The budgeting framework 
Prior to the establishment of SASSA, funds allocated for the payment of social grants 
formed part of the provincial equitable share, which is a direct charge on the National 
Revenue Fund. Accordingly, the formula for the division of the provincial equitable 
share allocation among the provinces contained a welfare component — based on 
the estimated numbers of people entitled to grants weighted by means of a poverty 
index derived from the Income and Expenditure Survey — with a weight of 18. In 
terms of the present budget framework, social assistance transfers are shown in the 
Comprehensive Social Security Framework programme on the budget of the Depart-
ment of Social Development, from where it is transferred to SASSA for disburse-
ment. The provincial equitable share formula was amended accordingly by scrapping 
the welfare component and re-weighting the other components. 
Two broader sets of reforms during the recent past have also affected the budgetary 
framework governing the social assistance system. In November 1997 South Africa 
entered a new phase of fiscal planning with the publication of the first Medium Term 
Budget Policy Statement. Subsequent budgets have been presented in the context 
of a medium-term policy frameworks consisting of three-year rolling expenditure and 
revenue projections for the national and provincial governments compiled against the 
backdrop  of  economic  and  fiscal  goals  and  prospects  for  the  economy.  The 
promulgation of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999 was a major 
step to increase the transparency and accountability of fiscal policymaking in South 
Africa. The Act emphasises regular financial reporting, sound internal expenditure 
controls, independent audit and supervision of control systems, improved accounting 
standards and training of financial managers, and greater emphasis on outputs and 
performance monitoring. Furthermore, it compels the South African fiscal authorities 
to disclose their longer-term objectives and views about future trends in fiscal policy 
annually, along the lines of the existing medium-term budgeting framework. 
3  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL GRANTS 
3(a)  OECD countries 
Social insurance programmes absorb about 85 percent of total social security expen-
diture in OECD countries and social assistance schemes the remaining 15 percent 
(World Bank, 2006: 1).
14 The overall coverage of social assistance schemes remains 
low despite significant increases in the number of recipients of grants since 1980: in 
1999, only 3 percent of the working-age populations of continental European coun-
tries and 9 percent of that of the United Kingdom received targeted social assistance 
benefits (De Neubourg et al, 2007: 17 -18).
15 Social assistance schemes therefore 
                                                 
14  These  averages  mask  considerable  variation.  Anglo-Saxon  countries  generally  devote  larger 
chunks  of  their  social  security  outlays  to  social  assistance  schemes  and  correspondingly  smaller 
portions  to  social  insurance  programmes  than  the  countries  of  continental  Europe  (International 
Labour Organisation, 2000: 181; World Bank, 2006: 2). 
15 The International Labour Organisation (2000: 180) ascribed this increase in  the number of social-
assistance beneficiaries to  growing unemployment, changes in employment patterns that have pre -
vented growing numbers of workers from accumulating adequate entitlements for full income pro tec-
tion, the proliferation of single-parent families, and reductions in the levels of social insurance bene -
fits.   23 
play a residual role in the social security systems of most industrialised countries and 
their impact on poverty and inequality tends to be marginal. Such schemes nonethe-
less are very effective at, as De Neubourg et al (2007: 13) put it, "weaving the safety 
net tightly" for those needy people who receive inadequate or no benefits from contri-
butory programmes and other forms of social protection (cf. also International Labour 
Organisation, 2000: 179). In a number of these countries, social assistance program-
mes function as income guarantee schemes that complement contributory schemes 
by providing tax-financed minimum incomes on a means-tested basis. Other com-
mon types of social transfers in OECD countries include cash and in-kind housing 
benefits, universal or means-tested family benefits, cash benefits for lone parents, 
employment-conditional benefits for able-bodied individuals, and childcare benefits 
(World Bank, 2006: 3). 
In  recent  decades, a number of trends  in OECD  countries have  caused  concern 
about the long-term financial viability of social protection systems, including rising 
long-term unemployment, globalisation-induced pressure on tax bases and tax rates, 
population ageing and changes in family structures such as growing numbers of one-
parent families (World Bank, 2006: 5). Along with mounting unwillingness among tax-
payers to pay for social protection caused in part by perceptions of growing welfare 
dependence among the recipients of grants (cf. De Neubourg et al, 2007: 30), these 
trends have stimulated widespread reform of social assistance and other compo-
nents of social security systems. The remainder of this subsection discusses the 
nature of these reforms in broad terms and provides a more detailed review of one of 
its most prominent examples, namely workfare programmes. 
Debates about the reform of social assistance schemes in OECD countries have 
revolved around links between the nature of such schemes, work incentives, and 
social exclusion.
16 To discourage dependence on social grants, many OECD coun -
tries have reduced the amounts and duration of benefits and tightened requirements 
that beneficiaries should seek work actively (World  Bank, 2006: 7). Such reforms 
often have been accompanied by the following measures to encourage working and 
social inclusion: terminating the practice of cancelling benefits when recipients obtain 
part-time work, changing the delivery of benefits from the household to individuals so 
that individuals do not jeopardise the household's access to benefits when they find 
jobs, providing benefits conditional on finding employment (e.g. cash bonuses, wage 
supplements and tax credits), and offering more assistanc e to job seekers (labour-
market information, training programmes, etc) (World Bank, 2006: 7). This has been 
described as a shift from protective to productive modes of providing social assis -
tance (and social protection more generally) (Hudson and Kühner, 2009).
17 
The United States pioneered modern welfare reforms aimed at integrating recipients 
of social benefits into the formal labour market. The approach, which has become 
                                                 
16 Social exclusion is defined as "... a multi-dimensional socio-economic conception of deprivation" 
that often involves "... the development of an 'underclass' mentality, with little emphasis on the per-
sonal responsibility to find work" (World Bank, 2006: 7). 
17 There is some debate about the actual extent of this shift in focus. Hudson and Kühner (2009), for 
example, compared the welfare states of 23 OECD countries in 1994, 1998 and 200 3 and found that 
a shift towards the productive model of social protection occurred in some but by no means all of 
them.   24 
known as workfare
18, can be traced back to experimental programmes introduced by 
the Reagan Administration in 1981, but reached maturity under the Clinton Adminis-
tration with the implementation of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 and other welfare reforms. Ochel (2005: 78) defined work-
fare as "programmes or schemes that require people to work in return for social 
assistance benefits" and stressed three aspects of this definition: 
  Participation in workfare programmes is compulsory  for unemployed people 
deemed physically and mentally able to  work and non-compliance with pro-
gramme requirements could jeopardise recipients' benefits. 
  The primary focus of workfare programmes is work; training and other mecha-
nisms  to  achieve  reintegration  into  the  labour  market  are  of  secondary 
importance. 
  Workfare programmes are linked with policies tied to the lowest tier of public 
income support. 
The major elements of US workfare programmes are as follows (cf. Blank, 2004: 4-
8). First, PRWORA abolished the matching-grant Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) programme and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families  (TANF),  provided  to  states  as  a  block  grant.  The  introduction  of  TANF 
allowed the states much more discretion over programme design than AFDC, and 
the block-grant basis raised the importance of careful design by transferring the full 
financial risk of cycles in assistance needs to states. The PRWORA legislation also 
made access to federal funds conditional on states placing larger numbers of their 
active welfare recipients in jobs, limited TANF-funded assistance to 60 months over 
the full lifetimes of individuals, and limited access to income assistance programmes 
among targeted groups (e.g. immigrants and certain categories of disabled persons). 
The states responded to the PRWORA legislation by: 
  markedly expanding their welfare-to-work programmes 
  reducing the earnings disregard (i.e. the rate at which cash benefits decrease 
as earnings increase) to encourage working 
  enforcing benefit losses on assistance recipients who did not participate  in 
work programmes 
  enforcing the Federal 60-month limit on eligibility for TANF-funded assistance 
and, in some cases, setting and implementing even tighter limits 
Other  policy  changes  strengthened  state-level  efforts  to  get  welfare  recipients  in 
jobs. These included the expansion of in-kind assistance to needy families by means 
of child-care subsidies, food stamps and Medicaid services, as well minimum wage 
increases and expanded refundable tax credits under the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) system (Blank, 2004: 9-12). 
In a careful review of the empirical evidence, Blank (2004: 14-18) highlighted three 
major results of this gamut of changes: 
  Welfare  caseloads  dropped by  42 percent from 1994  to  2001,  and  did  not 
rebound significantly during the 2000-2001 recession. 
                                                 
18  According  to  Kildal  (2001:  3),  the  term  "workfare"  is  derived  from  "work-for-your-welfare"  or 
"welfare-for-work".   25 
  Employment increased sharply during the late-1990s, especially among less-
skilled single mothers. Data from 2002 showed that the majority of the women 
who had left welfare in the 1990s remained employed, although a significant 
minority were jobless. 
  The  incomes  of  single  mothers  (the  group  affected  most  heavily  by  the 
changes) rose during the second half of the 1990s, despite the fact that many 
of them lost cash benefits as a result of the introduction of workfare. 
These developments suggest that workfare programmes have succeeded in their 
primary aims of reducing welfare caseloads and moving welfare recipients into jobs. 
Blank (2004: 37-40), however, added that it is particularly difficult to separate the 
effects of such programmes from concurrent labour-market developments such as 
the rapid growth in job opportunities and earnings in the US during the second half of 
the 1990s; furthermore, it is too soon to ascertain some of the longer-term effects of 
the welfare reforms on the livelihoods and social choices of needy families. 
Welfare reforms with workfare elements were also implemented in the United King-
dom by the Labour Government of Tony Blair, as well as in the Scandinavian coun-
tries. The UK reforms, known as the New Deal, offer assistance to four groups of 
welfare recipients: young unemployed persons aged 18 to 24, long-term unemployed 
aged 25 and above, lone parents and disabled people (cf. Kildal, 2001: 4; Ochel, 
2006:  80-81).  Younger  unemployed  persons  first  enter  a  period  of  intensive  job-
search  (the  "Gateway"),  after  which  they  have  to  choose  among  four  six-month 
options, namely subsidised employment, full-time education and training, voluntary 
service, and the Environmental Task Force (Ochel, 2006: 80). This is followed by 
another period of intensive job search (known as the "follow-through"). Unemployed 
persons aged 25 and above who have received the Jobseeker's Allowance conti-
nuously for 12 to 18 months undergo a 13-week Gateway period, followed by an 
Intensive  Activity  Period  that  lasts  another  13  weeks  and  provides  subsidised 
employment  or  education  and  training  opportunities  (Ochel,  2006:  81).  Several 
studies reviewed by Ochel (2006: 80-81) found that the New Deal programmes suc-
cessfully promoted the employment of younger and long-term unemployed people. 
The Scandinavian countries have long combined a commitment to the maintenance 
of full employment (pursued by means of active labour-market policies, inter alia) 
with  the  belief  that  generous  social  benefits  for the  unemployed  are  basic social 
rights regardless of achievements and financial means (cf. Kildal, 2001: 5-6). During 
the second half of the 1990s, however, the forces listed earlier led the governments 
of  these  countries  to  also  introduce  workfare-like  welfare  reforms,  with  Denmark 
leading the way. Prior to a series of labour-market reforms introduced from 1993 until 
1998, the jobless in Denmark could indefinitely access unemployment benefits, pro-
vided that they participated in work programmes for six months during each three-
year benefit cycle (Kildal, 2001: 7-9). The first wave of reforms abolished the right to 
earn new benefits through participating in work programmes by limiting the period of 
entitlement to seven years, of which the last three years involved compulsory "activa-
tion initiatives" aimed at reintegration into the labour market. The limits subsequently 
were tightened and by 1998 the maximum unemployment period was four years, 
including three years of activation activities. In 1996, these steps were complemen-
ted by special measures for low-skilled individuals under 25 years of age, who after 
six months of unemployment were compelled to enter education or work training pro-  26 
grammes and accept sharply reduced benefits. Ochel (2006: 81) reported positive 
employment effects for these Danish workfare programmes, but Kildal (2001) was 
more circumspect and expressed concern about the implications of such program-
mes for norms of fairness and justice that have long underpinned the Scandinavian 
welfare regimes. 
The available evidence therefore indicates that workfare programmes can be effec-
tive mechanisms for returning welfare recipients to work, especially in rapidly grow-
ing economies where sufficient numbers of jobs are created to absorb programme 
participants in the regular labour market. The importance of the availability of jobs is 
magnified  by  the  reality  that  workfare  programmes  affect  the  low-skilled  labour 
market by assisting unemployed people in getting regular public or private sector 
employment. In contrast to public works programmes, which provide government-
created temporary jobs, workfare therefore causes competition between social secu-
rity recipients and regular workers for low skilled work in the formal labour market 
(e.g. sweeping streets, cleaning parks, and basic clerical tasks). In some cities in the 
US,  such  as  Baltimore,  regular  low-skilled  workers  were  displaced  by  workfare 
workers,  who  were  not  unionised  and  were  paid  less  than  the  minimum  wage 
(Samson, Rosenblum, Haarmann, Haarmann, MacQuene and Van Niekerk, 2001: 
4). The perverse result was that people who were in regular paying work ended up 
on  welfare  because  their  jobs  were  taken  by  workfare  participants.  Hence, 
inadequate availability of jobs may well be the most serious barrier to the successful 
implementation of workfares programmes. Furthermore, the US experience showed 
that  workfare  programmes  can  be  time-consuming  and  financially  expensive:  the 
costs to be taken into consideration are the work-related and child care expenses of 
recipients as well as supervisory and administrative costs (Samson et al, 2001: 12). 
In  discussing  the  Scandinavian  experience,  Kildal  (2001:  14)  also  warned  that 
workfare-type programmes could easily lead to two-tiered labour markets in which 
poor labourers are compelled to work on "second-rate terms", lacking labour rights 
and sickness, vacation and unemployment benefits. 
3(b) Developing countries 
The  colonial  authorities  introduced  rudimentary  social  security  systems  in  most 
African,  Asian  and  Latin  American  countries.  Such  systems  offered  health  care, 
maternity leave, disability allowances and pensions for small sections of the popula-
tion – mainly civil servants and employees of large enterprises – but bypassed the 
numerically dominant poor (especially those living in rural areas) (Townsend, 2007: 
32). After obtaining independence, a considerable number of developing countries 
introduced  or  expanded  social  assistance  programmes  to  assist  households  not 
covered  by  social  insurance  schemes.  Such  schemes  usually  were  afforded  a 
relatively low priority compared to social services such as education and health care, 
however, and funding was restricted further by limited tax resources. To this day, the 
benefits  provided  by  most  developing  countries  have  remained  modest.  Further-
more, in most countries coverage have remained low and restricted to the victims of 
particular contingencies (e.g. widows, orphans and elderly people without income 
and family support). International Labour Organisation data reported by Townsend 
(2007: 179-180,  181)  suggest  that  approximately  90 percent  of  the  inhabitants of 
South  Asia  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  20  to  60 percent  of  the  populations  of 
middle-income  countries  lack  any  form  of  statutory  social  protection.  The  bleak   27 
picture extends to the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Prior to 1989, these socialist countries did not provide unemployment insurance, and 
devoted limited resources to social assistance schemes. Even by the turn of the cen-
tury, the share of social security expenditure they devoted to social assistance and 
unemployment benefits remained marginal (ILO, 2000: 56). 
Several  developing  countries  apart  from  South  Africa  maintain  substantial  social 
assistance  systems,  including  Brazil,  Mexico,  Botswana,  Namibia  and  India  (cf. 
Townsend, 2007: 32-34). Arguably the most thoroughly studied reform initiative in 
recent years has been the introduction of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in seve-
ral Latin American and Central American countries. The remainder of this section 
provides a brief review of the Latin American experience with CCTs. 
Latin America‘s inequality and poverty problems were exacerbated by the debt crisis 
of 1980 and the contagion effects of the Mexican and Asian crises of 1995 and 1997-
98, which reversed the economic recovery of the early 1990s. Amidst this turbulent 
economic environment within which social spending levels often came under severe 
pressure, Latin American countries introduced conditional cash transfer programmes 
(CCTs) to overcome the most common shortcomings of traditional social assistance 
schemes,  including  poor  targeting  of  the  needy,  high  administrative  costs,  frag-
mentation of projects and programmes, accusations of paternalism and clientelism, 
and an overemphasis  on  short-term  relief of  poverty  with  inadequate  attention  to 
longer-term poverty of a structural nature (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 30, 33). Britto 
(2005: 2-3) summarises the essence of CCTs as follows: "The operation of condi-
tional cash transfers (CCTs) consists in the provision of money subsidies to targeted 
households, provided they assure school attendance of their school-aged children 
and, in some cases, make periodic visits to health centers and attend other health-
related activities." Hence, CCTs combat current poverty (by providing income sup-
port that enables consumption smoothing) as well as future poverty (by encouraging 
human capital accumulation among the young in an attempt to break the intergene-
rational poverty cycle) (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 33). According to Britto (2005: 3), 
other objectives of CCTs are to overcome the failure of universal social policies to 
reach the poor – especially in the areas of education and health – and the failure of 
existing systems to provide adequate social protection during times of crisis. 
CCTs were initiated by Mexico to replace the regressive and urban-biased general 
food subsidy scheme (Britto, 2005: 7-8), but soon spread to other countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Introduced by President Ernesto Zedillo, the Mexican 
Progresa scheme provided cash and in-kind transfers to households whose children 
regularly attended school and whose members visited health centres regularly. The 
education component of Progresa targeted poor households with children in primary 
and secondary school, providing educational grants and support for school materials. 
The scheme also included supply-side benefits: teachers, for example, got bonuses 
for every pupil who was on the programme. The health component focused on poor 
households with pregnant and lactating women, children under two years of age, and 
malnourished children between the ages of two and five; the benefits included cash 
grants for food consumption, basic health services, nutrition and health education, 
and nutrition supplements (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: Table 1). Furthermore, Pro-
gresa had a positive gender bias: benefits were disbursed to the female heads of 
participating  households,  and  secondary-school  girls  received  larger  cash  grants   28 
than boys, because the former faced higher risks of dropping out of school and their 
educational attainment brought positive externalities (Britto, 2005: 8). In 2002, Pro-
gresa  was  renamed  Oportunidades  and  its  scope  was  expanded  to  also  include 
income generation for poor households by means of preferential access to micro-
credit, housing improvements, and adult education (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 32). 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso introduced the Bolsa Escola conditional cash 
transfer programme in Brazil in 2001. This programme granted monthly cash trans-
fers to poor households with children aged six to fifteen enrolled in grades one to 
eight, provided that they maintain school attendance rates of 85 percent or higher 
(Britto, 2005: 10-11). Bolsa Escola benefits were also disbursed to female heads of 
households. The benefits provided by the national governments were significantly 
lower than those of Progresa, but richer states and municipalities were allowed to 
raise the transfers or expand coverage. The details of the targeting of beneficiaries 
were also left to municipalities (Britto, 2005: 11). In 2003, Bolsa Escola was unified 
with other federal CCTs, creating a programme known as Bolsa Família. Apart from 
better coordination with other social spending initiatives, Bolsa Família added health-
related  conditionalities  to  Bolsa  Escola's  education-related  ones  and  markedly 
extended the coverage and size of transfers. It soon became Brazil's largest CCT in 
terms of coverage and financing (Britto, 2005: 12). 
Very similar CCT schemes exist in some other Latin and Central American countries, 
including  Colombia,  Jamaica,  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  (cf.  Rawlings  and  Rubio, 
2005:  31-32).  In  Honduras,  pupils  receive  education  vouchers  and  supply-side 
incentives  encourage  schools  to  participate.  The  health  and  nutrition  grants  are 
targeted at newborn babies until the age of 3 years or pregnant mothers in Honduras 
and  Jamaica.  Honduras  also  gives  health  and  nutrition  vouchers  and  nutrition 
training for mothers, and provides health centres with incentives to participate. 
CCT programmes use a variety of targeting mechanisms. Honduras uses the Height 
Census of first-grade school children to obtain data on the extent of malnutrition.
19 In 
Mexico, the qualifying communities in rural areas are selected using a marginality 
index based on census data. Nicaragua compares the results of house hold-level 
proxy means testing to results from geographic targeting. Furthermore, in Jamaica, 
beneficiaries‘ eligibility is continuously reviewed. This happens every three years in 
Mexico as well. In Nicaragua the programme only lasts three years in a community 
and is then phased out within two years; hence, inhabitants know that it is only a 
temporary measure (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005: 38). 
The evidence suggests that CCT programmes are effective mechanisms for allevia-
ting poverty, and this is reflected in increases in budgets and the number of reci-
pients. When Progresa began in Mexica it covered 300 000 people compared to 
more than 4 million people – or 20 percent of the population – in 2002 (Rawlings and 
Rubio, 2005: 38). The same trend is observed in Brazil, where the coverage of Bolsa 
Escola reached some 5 million people in 2002 (Britto, 2005: 7). Rawlings and Rubio 
(2005:48) reported that CCTs have had positive effects on school enrolment among 
boys and girls, child health and nutrition, and consumption levels. Brazil‘s 2000 cen-
sus showed that school attendance rates among poor children had increased by 4%, 
                                                 
19 Duflo (2003) used a similar methodology in a study to determine the nutritional status of South Afri-
can children staying with an old age pension recipient.   29 
while that of Argentina rose by 9% for beneficiaries between the ages of six and 17 
between 2005 and early 2007. This does not necessarily imply that child labour had 
declined, however, because school attendance can be combined with work (Britto, 
2005:  13).  Britto  (2005:  25)  also  pointed  out  that  the  effectiveness  of  CCTs  is 
influenced markedly by the environment within which they are implemented. In the 
Latin American context, for example, sustainable poverty reduction is likely to require 
appropriate macroeconomic  policy,  various  redistributive  policies and  initiatives  to 
enable the poor to accumulate more assets, in addition to CCT programmes. 
4  EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4(a)  The theory of the household 
The household has been considered as both a consumption and production structure 
(Becker, 1991; Edmonds et al, 2004). The unitary model of household behaviour 
assumes that members of the household behave altruistically and that the house-
hold‘s utility is maximised when pooled resources are allocated equitably among its 
members (Becker, 1991). A household considers its production function and as a 
collective bargaining unit decides on whether it needs additional income, and if it 
would be able to afford to support the member who is looking for work (Black, 2004: 
416). A household would take the decision to insure itself against risk by diversifying 
its sources of income and for consumption smoothing over time and for this it may 
require of a member of the household to migrate in search of work. This will highly 
depend on the search costs and additional income that may be gained from the job 
search (Black, 2004). However, the definition of households has implications for the 
social grants‘ impact on poverty and their behavioural impact on labour supply. 
The definition of household membership has significant bearings on research out-
come when assessing how social security affects households. This is more so in 
South Africa‘s case where the conventional nuclear family is less common and there 
are many cases of three to four generations living in the same household (Dinkel-
man, 2004). The question of who is included as part of the household is important. 
As noted by Posel et al (2006), specific criteria are used to determine household 
membership when household surveys are conducted. A key issue in this regard is 
whether  membership  is  determined  by  physical  presence  in  a  household  or  by 
resource sharing (in which case some physically absent individuals could be counted 
as household members). The strict residency rule stipulates that a person must be a 
resident  of  the  household  for  most  of  the  year,  to  be  counted  as  part  of  that 
household. The advantage of this rule is that it avoids double counting of individuals 
during censuses as well as reporting errors, because respondents are more likely to 
remember details about people they see almost daily (Posel et al, 2006: 838). The 
broad rule accommodates members who are at home for at least fifteen days in a 
year.  This  rule  is  a  more  realistic  account  of  South  Africa‘s  complex  household 
structures,  because  it  accommodates  the  fact  that  households  are  dynamic  and 
driven by economic factors like employment. It also takes account of the widespread 
occurrence of migrant labour in South Africa, which had its roots in apartheid-era 
settlement  patterns  and  has  been  perpetuated  by  spatial  differences  in  the 
availability of job opportunities (Posel et al 2006; Lund, 2006). To show the complexi-
ties of definition, Edmonds et al (2004) use the term ‗households‘ to refer to co-
resident  individuals  and  "family"  as  the  relatives  of  the  household.  It  is  unclear   30 
whether ‗household‘ would exclude member of household working away from home. 
Posel et al (2006), who consider the household to include migrant labourers, found a 
positive  impact  of  the  pension  on  labour  force  participation,  while  Bertrand  et  al 
(2003) and Dinkelman (2004), who treated the household as exogenous and looked 
at labour responses to social grants, found different results. 
Dinkelman (2004) observed that households have four main roles in South Africa. 
First, they are private safety nets for individuals without employment. Despite the fact 
that these individuals do not work, they are able to share in the resources of the 
household  by  attaching  themselves  to  households  that  have  pension  recipients 
(Klasen and Woolard, 2009). Second, households are the productive units proposed 
by Becker (1991), in terms of which households influence members‘ decisions to 
search for work or not. This could have adverse or positive effects. In the case of 
women, social grants have freed up women to look for work due to the availability of 
household  helpers  and  by  offering  income  support  (Dinkelman,  2004).  Third,  the 
household is a privileged source of information that furnishes a job searcher with 
information not available to other searchers because he or she is linked to the job 
market via household members. Such networks would be an advantage during times 
of high unemployment when education has less impact on who gets hired. Fourth, 
the culture of the household has a bearing on whether an individual will decide to 
look for work. This concept is difficult to measure because there may be other factors 
affecting  a  person‘s  attitude  towards  employment  which  may  not  come  from  the 
household.  Understanding  household  dynamics  around  social  grants  can  inform 
policy about how best to deal with unintended consequences of the grants as well as 
how to use the grants system to target poor households. 
4(b)  Social security and poverty 
Recent research has confirmed that the various social grants are well targeted at the 
poor and that they have a significant mitigating impact on poverty (cf. Van der Berg, 
Yu  and  Louw,  2008).  Fully  76 percent  of  government  spending  on  social  grants 
accrues  to  the  roughly  50 percent  of  individuals  who  constitute  the  poorest  two 
quintiles  of  households;  moreover,  grants  raise  the  income  share  of  the  poorest 
40 percent of households from 4.7 percent of pre-transfer income to 7.8 percent of 
post transfer income. 
Figure 11 gives a rough indication of the effect of social grants on the extent of 
poverty in 2005 (see Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008: 21-22). It compares 
the  actual incidence of  poverty  among  households  and  individuals at  the  time  of 
Statistics South Africa's Income and Expenditure Survey 2005 to the incidence that 
would have obtained if all respondents had reported zero income from social grants. 
The  actual  and  hypothetical  poverty  rates  for  households  were  33.2 percent  and 
43.9 percent,  respectively.  Hence,  if  nothing  else  was  different,  the  incidence  of 
poverty among households would have been about one-third higher in 2005 had the 
various types of social grants not existed. Similarly, social grants reduced the inci-
dence of poverty among individuals from a hypothetical 55.4 percent to 47.1 percent 
(i.e. by 15 percent). These numbers are indicative only – they rest on the very strong 
assumption that the availability or otherwise of social grants has no impact whatso-
ever on the behaviour of households in terms of labour supply, household formation 
patterns, etc – but nonetheless suggest that social grants markedly reduce poverty 
by augmenting the incomes of poor households.   31 
 
Other evidence also suggests that the recent expansion of the South African social 
assistance system has markedly reduced the incidence of poverty. Figure 12, which 
depicts poverty headcount rates based on data from AMPS (the All Media and Pro-
ducts Survey), shows that poverty decreased by 7 percentage points from 2001 until 
2006. Moreover, the portion of children whose parents reported that they had gone 
hungry in the previous year declined from 31 percent in 2002 to 17 percent in 2008. 
 
Social grants are important sources of income  for poor households, especially in 
rural  areas.  They  contribute  up  to  50%  of  income  in  households  headed  by  the 
elderly and prevent many such households from falling into poverty (Leibbrandt et al, 
2004: 13). The social grants are well targeted in South Africa because they reach 
most of the poor. The various grants cover children, the aged, the physically and 
mentally disabled and those dependent on specialised care. The old age pension is 
received by more than 80% of the aged and mostly black women (Case and Deaton, 
Figure 11
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1998; Van der Berg 1999; Lund, 2006). The old age pension and the child support 
grant programmes are effective in transferring money to predominantly poor families, 
especially households with children (Case and Deaton, 1998). Social assistance to 
the poor in the form of grants is used like normal income would be used by the family 
to buy clothing, food and education (CASE, 2000: 43). It has sharply reduced the 
incidence of poverty (Van der Berg, Louw and Yu, 2008). 
The gender of the recipient is important in the case of the old age pension: literature 
shows that women allocate the expenditure of the grant more efficiently than men 
(Duflo, 2003; Lund, 2006). Lund (2006) showed that there are improvements in the 
health status and nutrition of the family when the recipient is a woman. Duflo (2003) 
compared  the  weight-for-height  ratios  of  children  living  in  households  with  male 
pension recipients with those of households with female recipients. (The weight-for-
height ratio is a good indicator of nutrition as it responds quickly to the change in 
environment – see Duflo, 2003: 3.) Her results were that the weight-for-height ratios 
of girls increased while that of boys did not change significantly in households with 
female pensioners. In households with male pensioners, improvements in the health 
status of children (boys and girls) were not observed. 
The objectives of the child support grant (CSG) are to support households in meeting 
the cost of raising children, redistribute income, influence birth rates and relieve child 
poverty (Triegaardt, 2005: 252). The CSG was the result of the Lund Committee of 
1996, and the principal aim was to follow the child‘s development irrespective of eco-
nomic  status.  Despite  administrative  challenges  within  government,  research  has 
found  that  the  grant  has  been  effective  in  reaching  children  in  poor  households 
(CASE, 2000: 43). Triegaardt (2005) also noted that the CGS has been an important 
source of income for poor households. The unintended effect of this may have been 
that households have been reproducing to attain CSGs in order to avoid poverty. 
Receipt of child support grants has been found to be positively  related to earlier 
school enrolment. Lund (2006) found this to be extraordinary given that some of the 
parents did not have a formal education and that such household tend to be poor. 
Despite the contribution that it makes to poverty-stricken households, the grant is not 
reaching all impoverished children. A reason could be that some households do not 
have the resources to obtain and furnish proof of material need. 
South Africa lacks social security assistance for unemployed individuals who have 
not  worked  before.  The  Unemployment  Insurance  Fund  (UIF)  is  contributory  and 
benefits are not long lasting. Hence, the old age pension has been found to be the 
main  source  of  support  for  unemployed  individuals  in  the  rural  areas  (Case  and 
Deaton,  1998).  Unemployment  persists  because  individuals  attach  themselves  to 
households that have at least one pension recipient. Klasen and Woolard (2009) 
took the labour market as given, and evaluated how household formation responds 
to unemployment. They found that the unemployed have a low propensity to set up 
their  own  households  and  live  with  pensioners  to  get  access  to  resources.  The 
adverse effect of this coping mechanism is that when resources are stretched too far 
some households are plunged into poverty due to the pressure on resources (Klasen 
and Woolard, 2009: 32-34). People are crowded into households; it is common that 
there is up to three generations living in the same household. Because there is no 
social  policy  that  directly  assists  these  individuals,  their  attachment  to  poor 
households adversely affects all individuals living in that household.   33 
The incentive effects of other grants, such as the foster care grant and the disability 
grant, are also worth noting (see also sections 4(c) and 4(d) below). Families may 
foster children above the CSG age of eligibility because they themselves are poor 
and need the additional income. The foster care grant is three times the CSG and 
lasts  longer;  therefore  people  have  an  incentive  to  foster children  to  receive  this 
grant. A positive effect of the foster care grant is that it enables poor households to 
release their children to go and live with other families where they would be better 
cared for (Vorster et al, 2000). Social workers have observed that the grants are 
used as measures of poverty alleviation rather than being primarily to protect a child, 
and household  members do  not  direct the spending  of  income towards  the  child 
(Naicker, 2005).  
4(c)  Social security and the labour market 
A household may decide to insure itself against risk by diversifying its sources of 
income by sending out members of the household to look for work away from home. 
Bertrand  et  al  (2003:  30)  found  that  the  social  pension  reduces  willingness  to 
participate in the labour force. They found a large drop in labour force participation 
among  prime-aged  males  living  in  pensioner  households,  especially  where  the 
pensioners are women.  
The old age pension and the labour market 
Klasen  and  Woolard  (2005)  found  results  indicating  that  unemployment  persists 
because individuals who should be actively looking for work move into households 
that receive pensions. The pension acts as a safety net for people who are unem-
ployed; however, the downside is that this coping strategy negatively influences job 
search  prospects  because  the  households  supporting  them  are  often  located  far 
from labour market opportunities (Klasen and Woolard, 2009). They also observed 
that these individuals put a strain on the resources of pensioner households, pulling 
everyone into poverty. Although agreeing with Bertrand et al (2003) that the social 
grants end up supporting people whom it was not intended to support, Klasen and 
Woolard (2009) linked this phenomenon to the poor employment prospects of those 
without economic support: high search costs often prevent unemployed individuals 
who lack such support from obtaining work away from home. 
There  is  a  different  view  from  Posel  et  al  (2003),  who  investigated  how  social 
pensions influence household labour supply in the context of migrant labour. Posel et 
al (2003: 837) showed that the inclusion of migrant labourers as household members 
changes outcomes; in fact, they argued that pensions affect labour supply positively. 
They found that social grants facilitate the ability of household members to look for 
employment away from home. These results were more prominent among women, 
who left home to look for work (albeit often temporary work) away from the rural 
areas. Pension income frees up female labour as it contributes towards child care 
and  also  gives  women  financial  support  to  migrate  to  places  where  employment 
opportunities exist (Lund, 2006). This is profoundly different from the results obtained 
by Bertrand et al (2003), who only surveyed resident household members and did 
not take into account the fluidity of many South African households. 
The  reservation  wage  of  individuals  who  are  not  employed  and  who  live  in 
households  with  grant  recipients  may  be  higher.  Kingdon  and  Knight  (2000:  2)   34 
warned that higher household incomes which result in intra-household transfers to 
unemployed members may lower individuals‘ search efforts as income effects allow 
them more leisure – the so-called taste for unemployment hypothesis. Bertrand et al 
(2003)  and  Dinkelman  (2004)  found  empirical  support  for  this  hypothesis.  By 
contrast,  Klasen  and  Woolard  (2009) found  little  evidence  of  disincentive  effects. 
Furthermore, Posel et al (2003) found no convincing evidence that prime-aged males 
do not actively seek employment. Black (2004: 419) argued that it is not rational to 
look for employment if the probability of finding it is too low compared to the effort 
and the costs involved in the search. For Lund (2006) these findings that suppose 
that prime-aged males were the main beneficiaries of pensions did not make econo-
mic sense in the current South African environment "of high unemployment and high 
search  for  jobs  so  desperate  that  it  seems  less  credible  that  these  men  would 
voluntarily leave the job market" (Lund, 2006: 172). 
Conclusions on the effects of social grants on the supply of labour therefore depend 
markedly on how the household is modelled. When it is exogenous to the model, the 
effects is negative; however, if migrant labourers are included as illustrated by Posel 
et  al  (2003),  social  pensions  enable  women  to  look  for  work,  where  they  would 
previously have been bound by the absence of financial support and the obligation to 
care for children in the household. There is no conclusive evidence on the deterrent 
effect of pension income on labour-market participation among prime-aged males. 
Effects of the disability grant on the labour market 
The impact of HIV/Aids on prime-aged individuals means that households often forgo 
the incomes of the affected members. Disability grants (DGs) are available to those 
who  are  mentally  and  physically  unable  to  effectively  partake  in  labour-market 
activity, including HIV/Aids-infected individuals. Provinces undertake the assessment 
of  eligibility  differently,  but  the  two  most  common  methods  are  case-based 
assessment by panels consisting of social workers, nurses, social services officers 
and  community  members  (Nattrass,  2006a),  and  examination  of  applicants  for 
eligibility by district medical practitioners. In the Western Cape, only individuals who 
have CD4 cell counts below 200 or who are in clinical stage 4 of AIDS qualify for 
disability grants (Nattrass, 2006a:7). Such grants are conditional: individuals who are 
restored back to health no longer qualify for assistance. This provision, however, 
gives rise to a potential policy conflict between social welfare and the health policy of 
providing anti-retroviral treatment. 
The  Government  has  been  providing  Highly  Active  Anti-retroviral  Treatment 
(HAART) to improve the health status of HIV/AIDS-infected individuals. HAART is 
said to be a highly effective treatment that has improved the health status of many 
infected persons to the extent that they have again become able to take up formal 
employment. Given the high unemployment rate in South Africa, some DG recipients 
may be induced to discontinue HAART, thus compromising their health in order to 
remain eligible for grants (Nattrass, 2006a). One of the dangers of discontinuation of 
treatment  is  the  possible  emergence  of  a  multi-drug  resistant  strand  of  the  virus 
which  could  spread  throughout  the  population  (Nattrass,  2006b).  There  is  some 
evidence  of  alarming attitudes  towards  the DG:  some  regard  it  as  a  lifeline  (and 
would rather contract HIV than remain poor), while others harbour the perception 
that people without jobs are entitled to apply for disability grants (CASE, 2005:92).   35 
Furthermore, there was an observed increase in the uptake of the DG between 1995 
and 2005. This could in part have been because individuals engaged in risky beha-
viour to get grants or because of the spread of HIV-related illnesses such as tuber-
culosis (Department of Social Development, 2007). Vorster et al (2004) also noticed 
that  growing  numbers  of  women  and  younger  individuals  are  receiving  disability 
grants.  
The Child Support Grant (CSG) and the labour force  
There are low levels of employment among the primary care-givers (most of whom 
are women) of children receiving child support grants. Their employment rate is 18% 
compared  to  the  national  employment  rate  among  employed  women  of  33% 
(Department of Social Development, 2007). Many of the care-givers with jobs are 
either poorly paid or temporarily employed. Evidence suggesting that the CSG is a 
deterrent to obtaining employment is yet to come to light.  
4(d)  Other incentive effects of the social security system 
The Child Support Grant 
There is evidence of an increase in teenage pregnancy between 1995 and 2005: 
fertility increased amongst girls in their late teens or early twenties (Department of 
Social Development, 2006). The possibility exists that young mothers may use the 
grant to gain financial independence from the household. Mothers receive the grant 
on behalf of the children, despite the fact that they may not effectively function as the 
primary  caregivers.  However,  there  is  counterevidence  that  should  also  be 
considered. Only 5.3% of CSG mothers are young mothers in the group 15-19 and 
they account for only 18% of all mothers receiving grants in the 2001 census. This 
implies  an  underrepresentation,  suggesting  that  the  existence  of  the  grant  is 
insufficient motivation to fall pregnant (Department of Social Development, 2006). 
The  increase  in  the  uptake  of  the  grant  is said  to  have  been mostly  because  of 
growing awareness of its availability. That mothers who are not primary caregivers 
receive the grant is indicative of the complex structure of many African households.  
The foster care grant 
The  possibility  exists  that  foster  parents  could  use  foster  care  grant  money  for 
purposes other than assisting foster children. Due to the overload on the system, 
which especially affects social workers and child courts that dealt with foster cases, 
social workers opt to register families for the FCG if they do not qualify for the CSG 
―just to get them off their back‖ (Vorster et al, 2000: 130). Clearly, there are issues of 
capacity involved, with courts in poorer provinces reported to be overcrowded by 
claims  and  social  workers  swamped  with  large  caseloads  (Nattrass,  2006a).The 
increase in the uptake of the FCG noted in section 3b also is related to the reality 
that many children are being orphaned by HIV/AIDS-related deaths. 
The means tests for the old-age pension and child support grant 
The means test for social pensions has a number of incentive effects:   36 
  on  retirement  age,  as  few  people  apart  from  high  income  earners  find  it 
worthwhile to remain in the labour force beyond the inception age for the old 
age pension; 
  on own provision for retirement (e.g. private pensions), as many people have 
little incentive to provide for themselves if the net result will only be that they 
receive less from the state; 
  on preservation of pensions when people leave their jobs and on their choice 
between whether they should belong to a pension or to a provident fund; 
  on asset creation, as certain assets are less visible and therefore less likely to 
exclude people from benefiting from the old age pension; and 
  on household formation, as mentioned above 
Although the means test for disability grants operates in exactly the same way as 
that for social pensions, the major practical difficulties relate to the application of the 
medical criteria for eligibility. This means test would have to be retained even if the 
old-age pension becomes universal. 
We mentioned earlier that the initial means test for child support grants was based 
on a two-step procedure: 
  First, the full rural and squatter population as well as all other people with an 
income below R800 per month were selected; 
  Of this group, those with monthly incomes above R1 100 were excluded. 
This effectively meant that people in rural and squatter areas received the grant if 
their incomes were below R1 100, whilst urban dwellers received it if their incomes 
were below R800 per month. Hence, there was a bias towards the rural and squatter 
population. This bias, however, was eliminated when the means test was changed in 
2008. The availability of child support grants nonetheless may still influence where 
and with whom children reside. Prior to the introduction of the grants, many children 
were left with grandmothers or relations in rural areas while their mothers searched 
for  jobs  in  urban  areas.  The  wider  availability  of  grants  in  the  urban  areas  has 
enabled more mothers to keep their children with them; this may have stimulated the 
migration  of  children  to  the  urban  areas.  Whether  such  migration  improves  or 
worsens the welfare of children is not clear a priori. Children may well be better off 
with their mothers compared to living with grandmother or relations in rural areas, but 
would be left worse off if the mothers do not have the time to give children the care 
they need. 
5  THE  MAGNITUDE  AND  IMPACT  OF  GRANTS:  SOME  QUANTITATIVE 
DIMENSIONS 
5(a)  The Child Support Grant 
Figure 13 confirms that the child support grant is the most rapidly growing grant type. 
As mentioned earlier, this grant was introduced after the political transition and has 
been expanded dramatically in scale and as a proportion of total spending on social 
grants. This has occurred largely because of the very rapid expansion of the child 
support grant, even at a time when the value and  numbers of recipients of other 
grants have increased as well (see Tables 5 and 6).   37 
Figure 13 
Percentage contribution of spending on each type of social grant to total 
spending on social grants 
Source: National Treasury website 
Table  5  shows  the  monthly  nominal  values  of  the  various  grants  and  how  this 
changed over time, with the CSG at R230 from October 2008 much smaller than 
most other grants, notably foster care grants. Table 7 and Figure 15 show the real 
trends in grant values, from which it is apparent that the CSG has not consistently 
kept up with inflation. 
Table 5 
Monthly amount of each type of grant (Rand) 
















April 1999  520  520  538  374  520  100  94 
April 2000  540  540  558  390  540  100  100 
April 2001  570  570  588  410  570  110  110 
April 2002  640  640  658  460  640  140  130 
April 2003  700  700  718  500  700  160  150 
April 2004  740  740  740  560  740  170  170 
April 2005  780  780  780  590  780  180  180 
April 2006  820  820  838  590  820  190  180 
April 2007  870  870  890  620  870  200  200 
April 2008  940  940  960  650  940  210  210 
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As Table 6 shows, growth in the numbers of recipients was quite significant for all 
grants since the late 1990s, but the dominant trend has been the strong growth of 
CSG  numbers  from  its  inception.  It  now  constitutes  almost  8.2  million  grants 
delivered monthly, out of a total of about 12.5 million grants. Figure 14 focuses on 
the CSG only to show its very rapid growth. 
Table 6 
Number of beneficiaries of each type of grant 
Fiscal year 


















1998/1999  1 812 695  633 778  9 197  71 901  16 835  34 471  8 496 
1999/2000  1 860 710  612 614  7 553  79 937  24 438  352 617  8 748 
2000/2001  1 877 538  627 481  6 175  85 910  28 897  974 724  9 489 
2001/2002  1 903 042  694 232  5 266  95 216  34 978  1 907 774  10 332 
2002/2003  2 009 419  953 965  4 594  138 763  58 140  2 630 826  12 787 
2003/2004  2 060 421  1 270 964  3 961  200 340  77 934  4 309 772  18 170 
2004/2005  2 093 440  1 307 551  3 343  252 106  88 889  5 663 647  23 131 
2005/2006  2 144 117  1 319 536  2 832  312 614  94 263  7 075 266  n/a 
2006/2007  2 195 018  1 422 808  2 340  400 503  98 631  7 863 841  31 918 
2007/2008  2 225 354  1 409 434  1 931  446 994  102 153  8 189 914  37 343 
Source: Department of Social Development 
The age-eligibility rules for the CSG have been changed in gradual steps. When it 
was introduced, care-givers who met the means test criteria could receive the grant 
until the child turned 7. This was expanded to children under 9 years in 2003, to 
children under 11 years in 2004, to children under 14 in 2005, and it will be further 
extended to children under 15 in 2009 (see Tables 7 and 8). According to the data 
from the GHS surveys, the coverage of individual children in the age -eligible group 
increased from 27% in 2002, to 46% in 2006, while for households with age-eligible 
children, coverage increased from almost 20 to 51% in the same period (Table 8). 
Higher coverage with an unchanged means test in nominal terms (implying that in 
real terms the means test became increasingly strict over the period concerned) 
implies that the expansion was largely the result of increased roll-out of the grant to a 
growing proportion of those qualifying for it.   
Figure 16 shows that the GHS sample figures deviate somewhat from official figures 
on CSG recipients. The ratio of the reported grant recipients to the officially reported 
number of grants extended ranged 85% to 101% over the five years covered by the 
GHS, which is encouragingly close to the official figures to at least use the GHS to 
analyse coverage patterns. It is not clear why the deviations between the two data 
sources  occur. With  rising  coverage,  it  may  be  that there  is a  lag  before  some 
respondents (particularly if they are not the caregiver of the child) ma y become 
aware of grant receipt. Figure 17 shows rising coverage overall as well as in each of 
the age groups shown. Initially when a new age group is included, there is low 
coverage, but this rises to around 50% of eligible households, given the  current 
means test. The more lenient means test recently announced probably implies that   39 
these numbers would increase greatly. For this reason, this section of the report 
focuses on the CSG. 
Figure 14 
Number of beneficiaries of the child support grant 
 
Source: Department of Social Development 
Figure 15 
Percentage change in the rand value of the child support grant 

























































CSG per month (2000 prices) 113.96 105.92 101.38 104.70 124.20 130.45 138.12 141.52 144.60 142.20 134.61
Inflation rate 7.6% 4.5% 6.5% 7.3% 8.8% 0.4% 3.3% 3.3% 7.0% 10.9%






















2009  40 
Table 7 
The child support grant in South Africa 
Who can apply? 
o  The primary care giver of the child or children concerned. The child and care 
giver must be South African Citizens or permanent residents. 
o  The child and the care giver should be resident in South Africa at the time of 
application. 
o  A child or children under the age of 14 (Note: 0-13 years is the eligible age 
since 2003 April). 
o  The care giver and spouse must meet the requirements of the means test. 
Means test
‡ 
A means test is the test used to measure the financial status of the applicant. In 
order to receive a grant, the applicant‘s financial income should be below a certain 
level. Until the means test was made less strict in 2008, the applicant could pass 
the means test if he/she lived: 
o  in a rural area and earned less than R1,100 per month or R13,200 per year 
o  in an urban area in an informal settlement and earned less than R1,100 per 
month or R13,200 per year 
o  in an urban area in a house or flat and earned less than R800 a month or 
R9,600 a year. 
Eligible age and the grant amount 
Year  Eligible age 
Amount per 






1998 April  0-6 years  R100  R113.96 
1999 April  0-6 years  R100  R105.92 
2000 April  0-6 years  R100  R101.38 
2001 April  0-6 years  R110  R104.70 
2002 April  0-6 years  R140  R124.20 
2003 April  0-8 years  R160  R130.45 
2004 April  0-10 years  R170  R138.12 
2005 April  0-13 years  R180  R141.52 
2006 April  0-13 years  R190  R144.60 
2007 April  0-13 years  R200  R142.20 
2008 April 
0-13 years 
(14-year-olds will be 
included from 1/1/2009) 
R210 
(To increase to 
R220 in 2008 
October) 
R134.61 
Source: Department of Social Development 
‡ As mentioned earlier, the means test for child support grants changed during the course of 2008. 
The details provided here constituted the means test when most of the data reported on in this section 
were collected. 
# The April CPI is used in each year to deflate the nominal values into 2000 values. 
In 2001 April, only approximately 1 million people received the child support grants; 
this figure had increased to more than eight times that in April 2008. Moreover, the 
spending on child support grants as a percentage of total social grants spending 
increased continuously (from approximately 7 percent in 2000/2001 to about 30 per-
cent in 2006/2007).   41 
Table 8 
Number of individuals and households receiving child support grants 
GHS  Eligible 
age 
Recipients of CSG     
[A]  [B]  [C]  [D]  [A]/[D] 
Of eligible 
age 
Not of  





2003  0-8 years  2 241 760  321 534  2 563 294    8 299 039  27.01% 
2004  0-10 years  4 201 481  175 526  4 377 007  11 100 241  37.85% 
2005  0-13 years  5 702 793  139 043  5 841 836  14 052 170  40.58% 
2006  0-13 years  6 459 760  265 579  6 725 339  14 152 509  45.64% 
HOUSEHOLDS 


















least 1 child in 
eligible age 
Coverage rate 
2002  0-6 years     845 577  79 725     925 302  4 329 616  19.53% 
2003  0-8 years  1 830 602  42 599  1 873 201  5 141 072  35.61% 
2004  0-10 years  2 776 295  29 621  2 805 916  6 054 697  45.85% 
2005  0-13 years  3 289 555  20 455  3 310 010  6 701 973  49.08% 
2006  0-13 years  3 504 585  35 843  3 540 428  6 884 332  50.91% 




The number of child support grant recipients of eligible age
(a comparison of figures in the General household surveys  and


































Official figures (Department of Social Security)
(GHS/Official figures)%  42 
Figure 17 
Child support grant coverage rates for different eligible age groups 
5(b)  Demographic characteristics 
Table 9 shows the demographic characteristics of the recipients and non-recipients 
of  child  support  grants  at  eligible  ages,  and  the  results  could  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
o  Province:  Nearly  60%  of  the  recipients  of  CSG  come  from  Eastern  Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. For Kwazulu-Natal this high proportion reflects its 
population size, but for both Eastern Cape and Limpopo coverage is far higher 
than the national average, due to the larger number of poor children found in 
these two provinces. Note that the Eastern Cape‘s share of grants rose from 
15% to 21% from 2002 to 2006, while that for Limpopo declined somewhat. 
o  Area type: More than 60% of the CSG recipients reside in rural areas, though 
fewer than half of age-eligible children are rural. 
o  Gender:  There  is  almost  an  even  split  between  male  and  female  CSG 
recipients, indicating that the gender of the recipient child is not an issue that 
affects coverage. 
o  Race: About 94% of the CSG recipients are black, a proportion that has not 
wavered over the years, despite broadening of coverage through the years. 
o  Attendance at educational institution at the time of the survey: In 2003, nearly 
two-thirds of the non-recipients did not attend educational institution at the time 
of the survey while the remaining one-third did, but this ratio has reversed in 
GHS2006.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  the  age  of  eligibility  for  the  CSG  has 












2003 2004 2005 2006
All eligible ages 0-8 years 9-10 years 11-13 years  43 
Table 9 
Demographic profile of the recipients and non-recipients of 
child support grants of eligible age 
  Eligible age + received CSG  Eligible age + did NOT receive CSG 

















Western Cape  8.1%  6.1%  5.4%  5.2%  9.8%  10.2%  10.9%  11.5% 
Eastern Cape  15.1%  16.1%  19.7%  21.2%  16.1%  19.1%  15.3%  13.8% 
Northern Cape  1.0%  1.8%  1.7%  1.6%  2.2%  2.1%  2.0%  2.2% 
Free State  6.9%  6.7%  7.0%  6.6%  4.9%  5.4%  5.4%  5.7% 
KwaZulu-Natal  17.0%  18.4%  20.2%  19.7%  22.9%  22.2%  22.2%  21.5% 
North West  9.4%  10.2%  8.0%  8.2%  8.3%  7.3%  8.0%  7.4% 
Gauteng  11.9%  10.6%  10.7%  10.9%  18.3%  17.7%  17.8%  19.3% 
Mpumalanga  10.6%  9.2%  8.9%  9.2%  6.3%  6.0%  6.6%  6.4% 
Limpopo  20.2%  20.8%  18.3%  17.3%  11.3%  10.0%  11.8%  12.3% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Area type 
Urban  38.5%  36.4%  n/a  n/a  50.9%  52.0%  n/a  n/a 
Rural  61.5%  63.6%  n/a  n/a  49.1%  48.0%  n/a  n/a 
  100.0%  100.0%  n/a  n/a  100.0%  100.0%  n/a  n/a 
Gender 
Male  50.0%  51.7%  52.0%  51.3%  51.0%  52.8%  52.5%  52.4% 
Female  50.0%  48.3%  48.0%  48.7%  49.0%  47.2%  47.5%  47.6% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Race 
Black  94.4%  94.1%  94.1%  94.4%  78.5%  75.9%  77.2%  76.0% 
Coloured  5.3%  5.6%  5.2%  4.9%  10.2%  10.7%  10.6%  11.3% 
Indian  0.2%  0.3%  0.6%  0.6%  2.4%  2.7%  2.8%  2.7% 
White  0.2%  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  9.0%  10.7%  9.4%  10.0% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Attendance at educational institution at the time of the survey 
Yes  36.7%  49.0%  58.8%  62.6%  46.5%  57.3%  68.7%  66.8% 
No  63.3%  51.0%  41.2%  37.4%  53.5%  42.7%  31.3%  33.2% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Note: Area type is no longer available from GHS2005. 
Table 10 shows the percentage of people of eligible ages that received child support 
grants, and the results could be summarized as follows:   44 
o  All: There is a continuous upward trend in the percentage of age-eligible chil-
dren receiving CSG (i.e., in the coverage rate), from 27.0% in 2003 to 45.6% in 
2006. 
o  Province: The coverage rate is the highest (more than 50% in 2006) in  the 
Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, but the lowest in Western Cape and 
Gauteng, reflecting the differences in the preponderance of poverty. The cover-
age in Western Cape has remained at about 25% throughout the years, while 
there has been a slight upward trend in Gauteng. In contrast to these provin-
ces, coverage in provinces where one would expect most poor children to be 
was initially low due to slow roll-out, but rose very rapidly (e.g. from less than 
26% to over 56% in Eastern Cape). 
o  Area type: The coverage rate is much higher in rural areas 
o  Gender: The coverage has always differed little by gender, and is rising for both 
boys and girls.  
o  Race: There is a rising trend in all race groups except whites. Coverage rate is 
highest for blacks, exceeding 50% in 2006. 
o  Attendance at educational institution at the time of the survey: The coverage 
rate is always higher for those eligible children not attending educational institu-
tion  at  the  time  of  the  survey,  largely  reflecting  somewhat  better  coverage 
among younger children. 
5(c)  Household characteristics 
Table 11 shows the household characteristics of the recipients as well as the non-
recipients of child support grants at eligible ages, and Table 12 the coverage rates. 
The results could be summarised as follows: 
o  Recipients  of  CSG  come  from  households  with  bigger  household  size  on 
average than non-recipient households with eligible-age children. 
o  More  than  50%  of  CSG  recipients  come  from  female-headed  households. 
Coverage  rates  for  male  and  female  headed  households  are  quite  similar, 
implying that female headed households constitute the majority of households 
with age-eligible children. 
o  More than 80% of CSG recipients come from households headed by people 
without Matric. Coverage drops sharply from well over half to just over a quarter 
for children in households where the head has matric, and to even less for 
those with higher qualifications. This clearly shows the effect of education on 
earnings and therefore on eligibility in accordance with the means test.  
o  More  than  half  of  CSG  recipients  are  from  households  headed  by  married 
people, but this proportion is showing a downward trend, complemented by an 
increasing  share  of  CSG  recipients  from  households  headed  by  unmarried 
people, from 15% in 2003 to slightly above 20% in 2006. Coverage rates are 
lower for children from households with married heads, but differ only a little for 
households with other different marital status, though. 
o  More than half of the CSG recipients come from households headed by people 
aged 35-54 years.  
o  CSG recipients should, per definition, usually not be from single generational 
households, although a small proportion in fact is. It is noticeable too that two-
generational  households  are  in  the  majority  and  that  their  share  has  been   45 
rising,  contrary  to  the  view  that  multigenerational  households  are  the  norm. 
Coverage is somewhat higher amongst multi-generational households. 
Table 10 
Percentage of eligible children receiving child support grants 
by demographic characteristics 









All  27.0%  37.9%  40.6%  45.6% 
Province 
Western Cape  23.5%  26.6%  25.4%  27.5% 
Eastern Cape  25.8%  34.0%  46.8%  56.3% 
Northern Cape  14.0%  34.6%  37.2%  39.0% 
Free State  34.3%  42.9%  47.0%  49.4% 
KwaZulu-Natal  21.6%  33.5%  38.4%  43.5% 
North West  29.6%  45.9%  40.6%  48.4% 
Gauteng  19.3%  26.8%  29.1%  32.2% 
Mpumalanga  38.3%  48.4%  47.9%  54.8% 
Limpopo  39.7%  55.9%  51.4%  54.2% 
Area type 
Urban  21.9%  29.9%  n/a  n/a 
Rural  31.7%  44.7%  n/a  n/a 
Gender 
Male  26.6%  37.4%  40.4%  45.1% 
Female  27.4%  38.4%  40.9%  46.2% 
Race 
Black  30.8%  43.0%  45.5%  51.1% 
Coloured  16.0%  24.1%  25.0%  26.6% 
Indian  2.3%  5.8%  12.6%  16.6% 
White  0.8%  0.3%  0.8%  0.8% 
Attendance at educational institution at the time of the survey 
Yes  22.6%  34.2%  36.9%  44.0% 
No  30.4%  42.1%  47.3%  48.6% 
Note: Area type is no longer available from GHS2005.   46 
Table 11 
Household characteristics of the recipients and non-recipients 
of child support grants at eligible ages 
  Eligible age +  
received CSG 
Eligible age +  
did NOT receive CSG 

















Mean  6.53  6.46  6.47  6.29  6.16  6.23  5.97  5.78 
Std Dev.  2.77  2.76  2.79  2.67  2.84  3.07  2.62  2.50 
Gender of household head 
Male  44.1%  42.5%  44.1%  42.6%  56.9%  57.6%  56.7%  57.0% 
Female  55.9%  57.5%  55.9%  57.4%  43.1%  42.4%  43.3%  43.0% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Race of household head 
Black  94.5%  94.0%  94.2%  94.4%  78.6%  75.9%  77.1%  76.1% 
Coloured  5.2%  5.7%  5.1%  4.8%  10.0%  10.7%  10.5%  11.0% 
Indian  0.2%  0.3%  0.5%  0.7%  2.4%  2.7%  2.8%  2.8% 
White  0.2%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1%  9.0%  10.7%  9.6%  10.1% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Highest educational attainment of household head 
No schooling  26.5%  26.5%  25.8%  26.2%  20.4%  20.0%  19.9%  17.2% 
Incomplete prim.  27.3%  27.6%  27.4%  26.2%  21.7%  21.7%  20.4%  19.2% 
Incomplete sec.  38.4%  36.6%  37.1%  38.4%  35.8%  32.2%  32.8%  34.8% 
Matric  6.1%  7.7%  8.2%  8.0%  13.5%  14.6%  15.7%  18.0% 
Matric + Cert/Dip  1.2%  1.3%  1.3%  0.8%  3.7%  6.3%  6.5%  6.1% 
Degree  0.6%  0.3%  0.2%  0.3%  4.9%  5.3%  4.7%  4.8% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Marital status of household head 
Married  57.3%  55.1%  52.9%  52.3%  64.7%  64.5%  62.9%  63.6% 
Widow/Widower  22.9%  23.4%  23.6%  22.4%  19.1%  19.6%  18.3%  16.3% 
Divorced/Separated  4.5%  5.2%  4.8%  4.2%  4.2%  4.3%  4.2%  3.9% 
Unmarried  15.2%  16.3%  18.7%  21.1%  12.1%  11.6%  14.6%  16.2% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Age of household head 
Under 18 years  0.1%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.4%  0.5% 
18-24 years  2.2%  3.0%  2.4%  2.6%  2.1%  2.1%  2.1%  2.5% 
25-34 years  16.7%  16.1%  18.7%  17.9%  20.2%  19.4%  17.9%  18.4% 
35-44 years  24.7%  24.1%  23.7%  24.4%  28.8%  27.7%  29.6%  30.0% 
45-54 years  21.0%  21.2%  21.7%  21.0%  18.7%  19.1%  21.2%  21.2% 
55-64 years  17.4%  17.9%  15.8%  15.7%  14.3%  15.0%  14.2%  13.7% 
65+ years  17.9%  17.5%  17.4%  18.2%  15.7%  16.3%  14.5%  13.6% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Number of generations in the household 
One  3.1%  3.0%  3.5%  3.5%  2.7%  2.5%  3.9%  4.0% 
Two  49.7%  52.0%  54.1%  55.5%  60.5%  61.0%  62.5%  64.9% 
Three  46.3%  44.2%  41.5%  40.3%  36.4%  36.1%  32.8%  30.6% 
Four/Five  0.9%  0.8%  0.9%  0.7%  0.4%  0.5%  0.9%  0.5% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
In addition, Table 12 shows the percentage of people in eligible ages that received 
CSG, and the results show the children coming from households headed by Blacks, 
without Matric, widowed or unmarried, and with more than two generations of people 
living together are more likely to receive CSG.   47 
Table 12 
Percentage of eligible children receiving child support grants 
by household characteristics 








Gender of household head 
Male  26.6%  37.4%  40.4%  45.1% 
Female  27.4%  38.4%  40.9%  46.2% 
Race of household head 
Black  30.8%  43.0%  45.5%  51.1% 
Coloured  16.0%  24.1%  25.0%  26.6% 
Indian  2.3%  5.8%  12.6%  16.6% 
White  0.8%  0.3%  0.8%  0.8% 
Highest educational attainment of household head 
No schooling  32.4%  44.6%  47.0%  56.1% 
Incomplete prim.  31.8%  43.6%  47.9%  53.5% 
Incomplete sec.  28.4%  40.9%  43.6%  48.1% 
Matric  14.2%  24.3%  26.3%  27.2% 
Matric + Cert/Dip  10.6%  11.1%  12.2%  10.3% 
Degree  4.0%  3.4%  2.9%  5.4% 
Marital status of household head 
Married  24.7%  34.2%  36.5%  40.8% 
Widow/Widower  30.8%  42.1%  46.8%  53.6% 
Divorced/Separated  28.4%  42.7%  43.7%  47.7% 
Unmarried  31.9%  46.1%  46.8%  52.2% 
Age of household head 
Under 18 years  9.9%  37.2%  23.7%  27.3% 
18-24 years  28.0%  45.7%  43.0%  46.5% 
25-34 years  23.4%  33.6%  41.7%  45.0% 
35-44 years  24.1%  34.6%  35.4%  40.6% 
45-54 years  29.4%  40.3%  41.2%  45.4% 
55-64 years  31.1%  42.0%  43.3%  49.0% 
65+ years  29.8%  39.5%  45.1%  52.9% 
Number of generations in the household 
One  29.7%  41.7%  38.2%  42.3% 
Two  23.3%  34.2%  37.2%  41.8% 
Three  32.0%  42.7%  46.4%  52.5% 
Four/Five  45.2%  51.7%  40.9%  52.8% 
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5(d)  Labour market 
Table 13 shows that the share of inactive household heads is larger among house-
holds  with  eligible-age  children  who  do  receive  grants  than  those  who  do  not, 
indicating that employed household heads are more likely to be disqualified in accor-
dance with the means test. The number of employed household members is only just 
above two-thirds on average in households receiving grants (which, as has been 
shown, are usually larger households), whereas it is almost 1 amongst non-recipient 
households  with  age-eligible  children.  The  number  of  household  heads  who  are 
broadly  unemployed  has  dropped  both  among  recipient and  non-recipient  house-
holds with age-eligible children. 
Figure  18  shows  the  percentage  of  age-eligible  children  receiving  grants  has 
increased for all employment status categories of households head, indicating broad 
expansion of the grant and not more targeting on poorer households.  
Table 13 
Labour market characteristics of the recipients and non-recipients 
of child support grants 
  Eligible age +  
received CSG 
Eligible age +  
did NOT receive CSG 
















Broad employment status of household head 
Inactive  41.5%  41.0%  41.9%  41.5%  32.8%  34.5%  32.1%  31.0% 
Employed  35.9%  36.0%  35.8%  36.2%  52.0%  52.7%  54.6%  55.8% 
Unemployed  22.6%  23.0%  22.4%  22.3%  15.2%  12.8%  13.3%  13.2% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Number of employed in the household 
Mean  0.68  0.68  0.67  0.69  0.95  1.00  1.03  1.04 
Std Dev.  0.84  0.83  0.83  0.83  0.90  0.92  0.93  0.92 
Number of narrow unemployed in the household 
Mean  0.63  0.58  0.60  0.59  0.51  0.50  0.41  0.45 
Std Dev.  0.99  0.93  0.94  0.94  0.94  1.00  0.79  0.90 
Number of broad unemployed in the household head  
Mean  1.28  1.22  1.18  1.08  1.00  0.96  0.82  0.79 
Std Dev.  1.29  1.22  1.18  1.10  1.21  1.32  1.09  1.06 
 
In addition, Figure 18 below shows that eligible children coming from households 
headed by inactive or unemployed people are more likely to receive child support 
grants, as these proportions have exceed 50% throughout the years.   49 
Figure 18 
Proportion of eligible children receiving child support grants, 
by broad employment status of household head 
5(e)  Hunger 
Table 14 shows that the proportion of households reporting that children went hungry 
in the year before the survey declined strongly for both recipients and non-recipient 
households with age-eligible children, from 56.5% in 2002 to 76.9% in 2006 and from 
69.0% to 84.7% respectively. It nevertheless remains surprising that more than 15% 
of age-eligible households reporting that children have gone hungry in the past year 
in 2006 still did not get the CSG. This may point to some over-reporting of child 
hunger, to temporary episodes of want (although 1.0% of such households still did 
report that children always went hungry), or to the means test or administrative con-
straints leading to errors of exclusion (poor children not being targeted). This issue 
deserves further investigation, though the more lenient means test should assist if 
the means test was the problem. Also, the expansion of the grant has reduced the 
proportion of non-recipient households with age-eligible children not receiving grants 
from 33% to 15%, indicating improved de facto targeting. 
5(f)  Living conditions 
The worsening of living conditions amongst recipient households (Table 15) implies 
not a worsening of conditions per se, but rather that the expansion of the grants (e.g. 
in the Eastern Cape) has be accompanied by better targeting to households with 
poor  living  conditions  as  the  roll  out  of  the  grants  improved.  So,  for  instance,  in 
GHS2003  only  32.4%  of  recipients  had  no  tap  in  the  house  or  on  site,  but  in 
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Table 14 
Household child and adult hunger frequency by the recipients and 
non-recipients of child support grants at eligible ages 
  Eligible age +  
received CSG 
Eligible age +  
did NOT receive CSG 
















Child hunger: Proportion of households reporting that a child went hungry in the past year 
Never  56.5%  64.4%  67.1%  76.9%  69.0%  72.7%  77.2%  84.7% 
Seldom  7.7%  6.6%  6.0%  3.3%  5.0%  5.1%  4.2%  2.9% 
Sometimes  24.5%  22.3%  20.1%  16.4%  18.4%  16.4%  13.7%  10.2% 
Often  6.8%  4.3%  3.8%  2.0%  4.5%  3.5%  2.7%  1.4% 
Always  4.5%  2.4%  3.0%  1.4%  3.1%  2.3%  2.3%  0.9% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Child hunger: Proportion of households reporting that an adult went hungry in the past year 
Never  54.9%  62.7%  65.7%  76.4%  67.0%  71.7%  76.1%  84.2% 
Seldom  8.3%  6.5%  6.2%  3.6%  5.5%  4.8%  4.3%  3.1% 
Sometimes  26.3%  22.6%  20.8%  16.3%  19.5%  16.8%  14.2%  10.2% 
Often  6.1%  4.8%  4.2%  2.3%  4.9%  3.5%  2.9%  1.5% 
Always  4.4%  3.4%  3.1%  1.5%  3.1%  3.3%  2.5%  1.0% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
5(g)  Income and expenditure 
Table 16 below shows that there is an increasing trend in the proportion of CSG 
recipients  having  pensions/grants  as  the  main  income  source  of  the  household 
(increasing from 38.0% in 2003 to 49.0% in 2006), but this proportion remains at 
approximately 25% for non-recipients. A majority of non-recipients claim that salaries 
and wages are the main income sources of the household. Additionally, Table 17 
shows that nearly 70% of the recipients of child support grants come from house-
holds with monthly expenditure less than R1200 per month, while this proportion is 
only slightly above 50% in the case of the non-recipients. Furthermore, Table 17 
shows that children coming from households spending less than R1200 per month or 
having  pensions/grants  as  the  main  household  income  source  are  more  likely  to 
receive  child  support  grants.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  monthly  household 
expenditure categories shown in Table 17 are constant in nominal terms, implying a 
tightening in real terms of the criteria, as also applied to the means test. (It should 
also be noted that household size is not considered.) As is to be expected, coverage 
has expanded in all expenditure ranges The fact that coverage is still only 60% in the 
bottom-most  category  is  surprising,  and  may  perhaps  be  due  to  non-recipient 
households in this category being smaller households, but given the means test, one 
would expect all households in at least the bottom two or three categories to qualify 
in accordance to receive grants, if these expenditures were accurately recorded.   51 
Table 15 
Percentage of eligible children receiving 
child support grants by living conditions 
  GHS2003  GHS2004  GHS2005  GHS2006 
Dwelling type 
Formal  25.5%  35.5%  36.6%  41.3% 
Informal  30.7%  42.9%  48.6%  56.0% 
Water access 
Piped (Tap) water in dwelling  14.2%  18.9%  21.6%  24.7% 
Piper (Tap) water on site or in yard  32.8%  46.9%  47.4%  52.3% 
No tap in dwelling or on site (Public 
tap, or Others)  32.4%  44.7%  49.4%  56.7% 
Sanitation 
Flush/Chemical toilet  19.6%  26.5%  28.7%  31.7% 
Pit latrine with / without ventilation  31.9%  46.8%  49.8%  55.8% 
Bucket toilet/None  34.3%  43.5%  50.3%  60.4% 
Fuel for cooking 
Electricity/Solar  19.5%  28.4%  30.8%  35.3% 
Paraffin  33.3%  46.5%  50.7%  57.3% 
Wood  33.9%  46.4%  50.4%  58.0% 
Others/None  33.1%  43.4%  47.8%  54.5% 
Refuse removal 
Removed at least once a week  21.2%  28.8%  31.4%  34.4% 
Removed less than once a week  17.9%  39.3%  43.1%  41.8% 
Communal refuse dump  29.2%  33.0%  48.4%  56.1% 
Own refuse dump  32.9%  45.8%  48.8%  56.4% 
Others/None  21.4%  40.2%  46.4%  53.9% 
Availability of telephone 
Yes  12.4%  15.5%  16.0%  19.7% 
No  30.1%  42.2%  44.8%  49.7% 
Availability of cell phones 
Yes  22.8%  33.3%  37.2%  43.2% 
No  29.8%  42.3%  46.6%  51.7% 
Table 19 and Figure 19 show the coverage rate by deciles of mean earnings (i.e. of 
employed household heads). It is clear that for this sub -group there is quite good 
targeting, in that the poorest deciles are far better covered, and that the expansion of 
the  CSG  over  the  years  has  improved  the  coverage  at  the  bottom  end   of  the 
earnings distribution.   52 
Table 16 
Household income and expenditure information by 
child support grant receipt status 
  Eligible age + received CSG  Eligible age + did NOT receive CSG 
















Main income source of household 
Salaries/Wages  34.2%  32.8%  34.4%  34.5%  53.8%  53.7%  57.5%  59.5% 
Remittances  19.5%  19.0%  12.8%  11.9%  16.0%  13.7%  12.1%  11.2% 
Pensions/Grants  38.0%  40.9%  46.8%  49.0%  23.6%  26.2%  24.3%  24.5% 
Sales of farm products  0.9%  0.8%  1.0%  1.3%  0.9%  1.0%  0.8%  1.2% 
Other non-farm income  6.3%  6.3%  4.5%  2.8%  4.0%  4.7%  3.8%  2.4% 
No income  1.2%  0.3%  0.6%  0.5%  1.7%  0.8%  1.4%  1.3% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Monthly household expenditure (Rand, nominal values) 
R0-R399  30.7%  20.5%  22.1%  20.2%  23.0%  14.1%  13.7%  11.3% 
R400-R799  38.7%  40.6%  40.6%  40.8%  30.5%  28.5%  28.0%  27.5% 
R800-R1 199  17.9%  20.8%  19.3%  22.3%  16.3%  15.7%  15.2%  17.6% 
R1 200-R1 799  6.7%  10.3%  9.9%  9.4%  8.2%  11.7%  11.9%  12.6% 
R1 800-R2 499  3.7%  4.6%  4.6%  4.0%  5.5%  7.4%  7.6%  8.1% 
R2 500-R4 999  2.0%  2.8%  2.9%  2.9%  8.4%  11.6%  12.4%  11.0% 
R5 000-R9 999  0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  0.4%  5.4%  7.8%  7.7%  8.2% 
R10 000+  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  2.8%  3.2%  3.4%  3.9% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
Table 17 
Percentage of eligible children receiving child support grants 
by monthly household expenditure 
  GHS2003  GHS2004  GHS2005  GHS2006 
Monthly household expenditure (Rand, nominal values) 
R0-R399  33.7%  47.2%  52.7%  60.1% 
R400-R799  32.5%  46.8%  50.0%  55.7% 
R800-R1 199  29.5%  44.9%  46.7%  51.8% 
R1 200-R1 799  23.8%  35.4%  36.3%  38.7% 
R1 800-R2 499  20.3%  27.6%  29.6%  29.3% 
R2 500-R4 999  8.1%  12.8%  13.8%  18.4% 
R5 000-R9 999  2.5%  2.9%  4.6%  3.8% 
R10 000+  0.0%  1.5%  1.5%  2.6% 
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Table 18 
































































































GHS2002  28.3%  22.5%  22.2%  20.2%  17.5%  15.1%  12.5%  6.1%  2.9%  2.6%  16.1% 
GHS2003  47.8%  40.0%  38.5%  37.1%  31.8%  27.0%  23.7%  14.3%  6.0%  2.2%  28.3% 
GHS2004  57.4%  56.4%  55.4%  50.3%  42.0%  33.3%  28.3%  15.6%  7.7%  3.1%  36.6% 
GHS2005  65.2%  58.4%  54.5%  47.7%  44.8%  35.2%  28.3%  15.7%  7.4%  2.6%  37.4% 
GHS2006  68.8%  61.2%  56.5%  52.1%  46.8%  34.8%  27.2%  15.4%  7.2%  6.0%  39.5% 
 
5(h)  Incentive effects of the CSG 
Little  research  has  thus  far  been  conducted  on  the  impact  of  the  CSG,  both  on 
poverty and on behaviour, yet the latter aspect in particular has generated heated 
public debate, with some people arguing that the CSG increases fertility. It is not 
possible to draw strong conclusions on this, yet a descriptive analysis of potential 
behavioural effects can perhaps be useful. These effects can potentially be catego-
rised into its impact on the following related aspects: 
  Fertility 
  Household composition or formation, and thus also migration. 
The first of these is undoubtedly the potential impact that receives most public atten-
tion. Little evidence, apart from anecdotal evidence, has been presented to support 
such a view. 
Economists would argue that incentives matter, and that the CSG changes incen-
tives for having  children. Yet, at the same time, as supporters of the CSG often 
Child support grant take-up by earnings levels (2002-2006)
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argue, R230 per month (the present value of the grant) is a rather small benefit to be 
gained for having a child, compared to the additional costs that a child brings. It is 
only amongst the very poor, mainly in rural areas, where it is possible that the bene-
fits could be seen to outweigh the costs. On the other hand, incentives matter at the 
margin: It is likely that there are some people for whom the additional benefits of 
having a child may make it less unattractive than it may otherwise have been. To use 
some of the anecdotal examples, for a teenage girl in poor circumstances in rural 
areas, the fact that such a grant exists may have an influence on how careful she is 
to avoid pregnancy. This alteration in incentives is thus likely to have some positive 
impact on fertility, as critics argue. But how large would such an effect be, and how 
widespread? It is likely that only a relatively small number of people would be in such 
a situation where a small grant would alter their behaviour in such a manner. Were 
the grant large (say ten times as large), a different scenario might have arisen (yet 
examples of where governments have tried to stimulate fertility in some developed 
countries  have  shown  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  do  so  even  by  offering  large 
incentives;  other factors than  only  costs  and  benefits  seem  to enter these  beha-
viours). There has been no clear evidence of fertility increases, or a reduction of the 
age of first conception, to support the view that the CSG has increased fertility; it 
may at most have succeeded in slightly slowing the rate of decline of fertility com-
pared to what it would have been. 
It is well established that, in South African circumstances, households form around 
income. The large old age pension has had a particularly strong effect in this regard 
in rural areas. Many studies indicate that household formation and composition are 
endogenous, i.e. that the social grant system affects the formation and composition 
of households (see e.g. Klasen and Woolard, 2009). Little of this research has yet 
been conducted on the impact of the CSG, but it is likely to have had some effect on 
household structure, even though the individual benefit is less than a quarter of that 
of the social pension. Posel et al (2003) argue that the CSG provides rural women 
with the capital to migrate to urban areas in search of jobs. On the other hand, it is 
not certain whether the existence of the CSG encourages mothers who do migrate to 
keep their children with them rather than to leave them with relatives in rural areas. 
Nor is it clear which would be better for the child, as being with the mother in urban 
areas  would  only  be  an  improvement  if  good  care  facilities  or  other  options  are 
available. 
6  CONCLUSION 
This paper confirms that South Africa has a well-developed social assistance system 
that is exceptionally large by middle-income country standards. South Africa‘s social 
grants are very well targeted and have a significant mitigating impact on poverty. 
Considerable  uncertainty  remains  about  some  of  the  incentive  effects  of  these 
grants,  but  it  is  becoming  increasingly  clear  that  they  influence  the  behaviour  of 
recipients and potential recipients in variety of ways, not all of which are necessarily 
benign. The emergence of firm evidence, or even sufficiently strong perceptions, of 
widespread perverse incentives resulting from social assistance schemes may raise 
the attractiveness to South African decision makers of programmes such as workfare 
and conditional cash transfers. In other countries, such programmes have shown 
promising  signs  of  the  ability  to  simultaneously  alleviate  poverty  and  incentivise 
desired behaviour. Important aspects of their longer-term impacts remain unclear,   55 
however, and their applicability in South Africa would depend crucially on contextual 
factors such as the availability of work opportunities for workfare participants and the 
ability of educational and health care institutions to participate effectively in condi-
tional cash transfer programmes. There is much scope for further research on the 
potential  of  these  and  other  innovative  social  assistance  schemes  in  the  South 
African context. 
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